Page 917
Wreck Commissioners' Court.
SCOTTISH HALL,
BUCKINGHAM GATE,
Monday, 1st July, 1912.
PROCEEDINGS
WIITH
THE RIGHT HON. LORD MERSEY,
Wreck Commissioner of the United Kingdom,
WITH
REAR ADMIRAL THE HON. S. A. GOUGH-CALTHORPE, C.V.O., R.N.,
CAPTAIN A. W. CLARKE,
COMMANDER F. C. A. LYON, R.N.R.,
PROFESSOR J. H. BILES, LL.D., D.Sc.,
MR. E. C. CHASTON, R.N.R.
Acting as Assessors.
ON A FORMAL INVESTIGATION
ORDERED BY THE BOARD OF TRADE INTO THE
LOSS OF THE S. S. "TITANIC."
THIRTY-FIFTH DAY.
THE RIGHT HON. SIR RUFUS ISAACS, K.C., M.P. (Attorney-General), SIR JOHN SIMON, K.C., M.P. (Solicitor-General), MR. BUTLER ASPINALL, K.C., MR. S.A.T. ROWLATT and MR. RAYMOND ASQUITH (instructed by Sir R. Ellis Cunliffe, Solicitor to the Board of Trade) appeared as Counsel on behalf of the Board of Trade.
THE RIGHT HON. SIR ROBERT FINLAY, K.C., M.P., MR. F. LAING, K.C., MR. MAURICE HILL, K.C., and MR. NORMAN RAEBURN (instructed by Messrs. Hill, Dickinson and Co.) appeared as Counsel on behalf of the White Star Line.
MR. THOMAS SCANLAN, M.P. (instructed by Mr. Smith, Solicitor), appeared as Counsel on behalf of the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the personal representatives of several deceased members of the crew and of survivors who were members of the Union. (Admitted on application.)
MR. BOTTERELL (instructed by Messrs. Botterell and Roche) appeared on behalf of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom. (Admitted on application.)
MR. THOMAS LEWIS appeared on behalf of the British Seafarers' Union. (Admitted on application.)
MR. L. S. HOLMES (of Messrs. Miller, Taylor and Holmes of Liverpool) appeared on behalf of the Imperial Merchant Service Guild. (Admitted on application.)
MR. COTTER appeared on behalf of the National Union of Stewards. (Admitted on application.)
MR. HAMAR GREENWOOD, M.P. (instructed by Messrs. Pritchard and Sons), watched proceedings on behalf of the Allan Line Steamship Company; and (instructed by Messrs. William A. Crump and Son) also on behalf of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.
MR. ROCHE (instructed by Messrs. Charles G. Bradshaw and Waterson) appeared on behalf of the Marine Engineers' Association. (Admitted on application.)
MR. A. CLEMENT EDWARDS, M.P. (instructed by Messrs. Helder Roberts and Co.), appeared as Counsel on behalf of the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Workers' Union of Great Britain and Ireland. (Admitted on application.)
MR. W. D. HARBINSON (instructed by Mr. Farrell) appeared on behalf of the third class passengers. (Admitted on application.)
MR. C. ROBERTSON DUNLOP watched the proceedings on behalf of the owners and officers of the s.s. "Californian" (Leyland Line). (Admitted on application.)
Mr. H. E. DUKE, K.C., M.P., and MR. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS (instructed by Messrs. A. F. and R. W. Tweedie) appeared as Counsel on behalf of Sir Cosmo and Lady Duff Gordon. (Admitted on application.)
MR. F. LAING, K.C., and MR. ALFRED BUCKNILL appeared on behalf of Messrs. Harland and Wolff. (Admitted on application.)
Page 918
The Commissioner: Sir Robert, I was asking Mr. Laing in your absence on Saturday about Lightoller's evidence; it presents, if it is to be accepted, in my opinion, considerable difficulties with regard to your theory. First of all there was clearly in my mind the discussion about every so-called abnormality which is relied upon before the Commission, except the swell, and the swell does not appear to me to make any difficulty, because they were not anticipating seeing any fringe round the bergs. That is the effect of the conversation. They did not anticipate any fringe round the bergs, and it was one of the difficulties they discussed. Therefore, it seems to me the absence of swell is not of any importance. The other difficulty that I had with reference to your theory is this. Lightoller made a calculation and came to the conclusion that they would reach ice at half-past 9. Now Mr. Laing suggested that that was not the true effect of this evidence; that all that he meant was that they would reach the region in which ice had been notified. That does not seem to me to be the effect of his evidence. I think his evidence means that in his opinion they would come where they might expect to see ice, and if he did make a calculation of that kind, and it was properly made, it is inconsistent with your theory that all the notified ice had, by the time of the collision, passed away.
Sir Robert Finlay: May I deal with both those points?
The Commissioner: If you please.
Sir Robert Finlay: I will take the second first, because I submit it admits of a short answer. Will your Lordship kindly look at the large chart which I handed up where the time is marked at which the "Titanic" reached 49 degrees and also the time when she reached 11 o'clock when she would be further on her course. Your Lordship will see soon after 9 o'clock the "Titanic" gets just beyond 49 degrees. Your Lordship sees the line down there does not mean any meridian; it is a line dividing the chart into 20 mile squares. At the top your Lordship will see longitude 49, and then if your Lordship goes down to the track which the "Titanic" took your Lordship will see that at 9 she was short of 49 degrees.
The Commissioner: I do not follow you.
Sir Robert Finlay: The track where the "Titanic" was proceeding where you have the legend "'Titanic's' course after 5.50 p.m., S. 50 W. true, speed 22 knots." Your Lordship sees "9 p.m." marked there. That is short of 49 degrees.
The Commissioner: It is slightly short of 49 degrees; about 3 miles.
Sir Robert Finlay: I think about 3 minutes.
The Commissioner: It is three miles in distance.
Sir Robert Finlay: Exactly. One calculation by which they would get soon after 9, to the region to which the "Caronia" message referred, is one of those which Lightoller referred to, that is his own calculation. He said: I made a mental note - I remember the expression - of 49 deg., because I considered the longitude of importance. That relates to the "Caronia."
The other, the 11 o'clock, relates to the "Baltic." Your Lordship will see that almost immediately below the position of the iceberg reported by the "Baltic" is "11 p.m.," as the position of the "Titanic"; so that it is quite clear that the explanation as I submit of the discrepancy is what Lightoller himself suggested, that Moody must have been dealing with the "Baltic" ice, while he, Lightoller, was dealing with the "Caronia" ice.
The Commissioner: Yes. It does not seem to me to matter which they were dealing with. Both of them came to the conclusion that they would possibly sight ice, and the calculations were based on one or other of the three telegrams.
Sir Robert Finlay: Yes.
The Commissioner: And that calculation, if it is accurate, seems to me to be inconsistent with your theory that they could not have sighted ice at that time, that none of the ice of the three messages could be sighted, because, as you put it to me, the ice had gone further South, and they were passing round the stern of the bergs.
Sir Robert Finlay: I submit there is no inconsistency at all, my Lord. What they apprehended was, although no other ice had been reported, and although the course that they took would avoid, and did avoid, the ice which had been reported, yet they had got to the longitude where this ice had been reported, and it was, of course, always possible that there might be other ice.
The Commissioner: Do not you see the danger of that? If they knew that they were in the region where ice might be, where icebergs might be, then they ought to have taken that circumstance into consideration.
Sir Robert Finlay: I think they did, my Lord, as I shall show in answering your Lordship's other question; but I hope that I have made clear that the explanation which Lightoller gave of that discrepancy between the two calculations is a correct one.
The Commissioner: I remember very well what he said, and a very unsatisfactory explanation it was.
Sir Robert Finlay: But, my Lord, it exactly fits in with the position of the "Titanic" at 9 o'clock and at 11 o'clock.
The Commissioner: It may be, but if you remember he said when Moody told him that he expected to meet ice about 11 o'clock, "I noticed that it was wrong, but I did not say so; he was busy at the time and I did not want to disturb him." It appears to me a most unsatisfactory explanation, but that is what he says. Then he says. "I thought" - he said this subsequently and seems very like an afterthought - "I thought that Moody's calculation was based on some other telegram."
Sir Robert Finlay: My Lord, I do not know whether Mr. Lightoller is now in the country. If your Lordship thinks it might conduce to the interests of truth to recall him -
The Commissioner: I do not want to have Mr. Lightoller back; I am quite satisfied with the evidence as far as it goes.
Sir Robert Finlay: If your Lordship pleases.
The Commissioner: I should not care for any evidence of Lightoller coming after the discussion.
Sir Robert Finlay: If your Lordship pleases.
The Commissioner: If you follow what I mean -
Sir Robert Finlay: I follow perfectly. My submission is that Lightoller's evidence as it stands is clear and consistent with the facts so far as relates to these two messages, and I submit it does not touch the point which I made that all this ice that was reported - the "Baltic" ice and the "Caronia" ice, as well, of course, as the "Californian" ice which was far to the Eastward - was successfully avoided, and the course taken was one which would avoid it, because, while the field ice and the smaller bergs would be well to the Northward, the big bergs must have gone to the South.
The Commissioner: I have been thinking very anxiously about your theory about the Labrador Current taking these big bergs to the South, and I shall give it great consideration. But it seems to me that your admission that there might have been other bergs in the track which they were following, put upon them, if it be true, the obligation to do more than they did.
Sir Robert Finlay: My Lord, I submit not for this reason. As soon as you have had a report of ice in a particular longitude, although you have taken a course which avoids the ice which is reported, every prudent navigator will take into account that there may possibly be other bergs; and then it comes back to the question whether, by following the course which is invariably adopted in North Atlantic navigation, of keeping the speed at which the vessel was going, there was anything in the slightest degree blameworthy.
The Commissioner: Then you come to the abnormality?
Sir Robert Finlay: I do, my Lord. I shall deal with that in answering your Lordship's second question.
Page 919
The Commissioner: Let me make it clear as we go along. There is a vast amount of evidence, and very good evidence too, good in quality and a great deal in quantity, to show that it has not been for a quarter of a century or more the practice to alter the speed merely because ice is to be seen, because experience tells them that they can always avoid it. But then there arises the natural question: then why did not you avoid this?
Sir Robert Finlay: That brings us to the abnormality.
The Commissioner: Yes, then comes the excuse for not avoiding it, the abnormality.
Sir Robert Finlay: May I put it as the reason why we were not successful in avoiding it? But before I pass from the practice, might I call attention to the fact that not only is there a vast body of evidence all consistent, but there is no contradiction from anyone engaged in that trade?
The Commissioner: It may be that I am quite satisfied that they were following a well known practice which was justified by experience - as you pointed out in your speech, justified by the excellent results in the absence of accidents, in following that course. That may be; but why did not they see it?
Sir Robert Finlay: That brings me to answer your Lordship's second question, and that relates to this. The circumstances were abnormal in two respects: in the first place the swell, if it had existed, as everyone believed it did exist, would have shown a distinct ripple at the foot of the berg, not so great, of course, as there would have been if there had been wind, but still perfectly noticeable. May I state one other point - that there would have been a second indication, which was also referred to, between Mr. Lightoller and the Captain, and that is this, that if you have got a berg which turns its black side to you, you get a light over the top, owing to the fact that the other side is white: but here we had that very rare phenomenon, a black berg with no white side.
Now, what I am putting to your Lordship is this - and I submit, when the evidence is looked at, it is clear - that this catastrophe arose from the fact that the "Titanic" was properly pursuing the regular practice in relying on what experience has shown to be the case, that you can see the bergs in time to avoid them. She did not see the berg in time to avoid it, because you had the extraordinary fact that two things, each rare in itself, a black berg and no swell, coincided; and thereby the ship did not get warning before she was upon it.
May I say one word with regard to the conversation with the Captain. We are now entirely in your Lordship's hands as to what took place upon that occasion, but what I wish to put before your Lordship is that it is clear that conversation related only to the absence of wind. I will show your Lordship - I am not going to make a speech, of course, but to refer to one or two questions and answers - that they never knew until they got to the water that there was no swell, and the combination - the extraordinary combination - was a black berg and not even a swell.
Will your Lordship kindly look at page 305, Question 13569. The Solicitor-General is examining. "Tell us what you were going to say? - (A.) In the event of meeting ice there are many things we look for. In the first place a slight breeze. Of course, the stronger the breeze the more visible will the ice be, or rather the breakers on the ice. Therefore at any time when there is a slight breeze you will always see at nighttime a phosphorescent line round a berg, growler, or whatever it may be; the slight swell which we invariably look for in the North Atlantic causes the same effect, the break on the base of the berg, so showing a phosphorescent glow. All bergs - all ice more or less have a crystallised side.
(Q.) Is it white? - (A.) Yes; it has been crystallised through exposure and that in all cases will reflect a certain amount of light, what is termed ice-blink, and that ice-blink from a fairly large berg you will frequently see before the bergs comes above the horizon.
(Q.) Now let me follow. Was there any breeze on this night? - (A.) When I left the deck at 10 o'clock there was a slight breeze - Oh, pardon me, no. I take that back. No, it was calm, perfectly calm.
(Q.) And there was no breeze. Was there any? - (A.) As far as we could see from the bridge the sea was comparatively smooth. Not that we expected it to be smooth, because looking from the ship's bridge very frequently with quite a swell on the sea will appear just as smooth as a billiard table, perfectly smooth; you cannot detect the swell. The higher you are the more difficult it is to detect a slight swell.
(Q.) That means, then, does it not, that if you are on the bridge and you are relying on the fact that there may be a slight swell, you really cannot tell from the bridge whether there is a swell or not - a slight swell? - (A.) We look at it rather the other way - that, though the sea may appear smooth, we pretty well know that there is a swell, though it may not be visible to the eye, nor yet have any effect on the ship. It is a most rare occurrence -
(Q.) You mean there nearly always is a swell in the North Atlantic? - (A.) This is the first time in my experience in the Atlantic in 24 years, and I have been going across the Atlantic nearly all the time, of seeing an absolutely flat sea.
(Q.) Do you agree from that experience that this was an occasion when it was an absolutely flat sea? - (A.) Absolutely flat. (The Commissioner.) Not in fact, but to all appearance? - (A.) In fact, my Lord. (The Solicitor-General.) He means in fact, my Lord. (The Commissioner.) Do you mean there was no swell at all? - (A.) I mean to say that the sea was so absolutely flat that when we lowered the boats down we had to actually overhaul the tackles to unhook them, because there was not the slightest lift on the boat to allow for slacking, unhooked." That the absence of swell they detected afterwards when they got down to the water; they did not know it from the deck. I think your Lordship will recollect that one of the Assessors, I think it was Captain Clarke, informed your Lordship in the course of the case, as your Lordship stated, that sailors talk of it as calm although there is a swell on.
Then, on page 306, the witness goes on at Question 13615: "At five minutes to 9, when the Commander came on the bridge (I will give it to you as near as I can remember) he remarked that it was cold, and as far as I remember, I said, 'Yes, it is very cold, sir.' In fact, I said, 'it is only 1 deg. above freezing. I have sent word down to the carpenter,'" and so on - "We then commenced to speak about the weather. He said, 'There is not much wind.' I said, 'No, it is a flat calm as a matter of fact.' He repeated it; he said, 'A flat calm.' I said, 'Yes, quite flat, there is no wind.' I said something about it was rather a pity the breeze had not kept up whilst we were going through the ice region. Of course, my reason was obvious; he knew I meant the water ripples breaking on the base of the berg.
(Q.) You said it was a pity there was not a breeze? - (A.) Yes, I said , 'It is a pity there is not a breeze,' and we went on to discuss the weather. He was then getting his eyesight, you know, and he said, 'Yes, it seems quite clear,' and I said, 'Yes, it is perfectly clear.' It was a beautiful night, there was not a cloud in the sky. The sea was apparently smooth, and there was no wind, but at that time you could see the stars rising and setting with absolute distinctness.
(Q.) On the horizon? - (A.) On the horizon. We then discussed the indications of ice. I remember saying, 'In any case there will be a certain amount of reflected lights from the bergs.' He said, 'Oh yes, there will be a certain amount of reflected light.' I said, or he said; blue was said between us - that even though the blue side of the berg was towards us, probably the outline, the white outline would give us sufficient warning, that we should be able to see it a good distance, and, as far as we could see, we should be able to see it. Of course, it was just with regard to that possibility of the blue side being towards us, and that if it did happen to be turned with the purely blue
Page 920
side towards us, there would still be the white outline. (The Commissioner.) Then you had both made up your minds at that time that you were about to encounter icebergs? - (A.) No, my Lord, not necessarily."
That merely means they were in the region where the possibility must be taken into account.
"(Q.) It sounds very like it, you know? - (A.) No, not necessarily, my Lord.
"(Q.) You were both talking about what those icebergs would show to you? - (A.) As a natural precaution. We knew we were in the vicinity of ice, and though you cross the Atlantic for years and have ice reported and never see it, and at other times it is not reported and you do see it, you nevertheless do take necessary precautions, all you can, to make perfectly sure that the weather is clear and that the officers understand the indications of ice and all that sort of thing. That is a necessary precaution that is always taken.
(The Solicitor-General.) There are one or two things about that I should like to be clear about. I caught you saying that you, or the Captain, said it was a pity there was not a little breeze because it would have shown the iceberg? - (A.) Yes, it would have assisted.
(Q.) Then you both realised at the time, did you, that since it was a flat calm it would be more difficult to see the ice? - (A.) As far as the case of the berg was concerned, yes, it would be more difficult; naturally you would not see the water breaking on it if there was no wind; and so you would not have that to look for.
"(Q.) Do you remember when the Captain was on the bridge with you, did you tell him that, as you made it out, you would get to the danger zone - to the ice region - about half-past 9? - (A.) No.
"(Q.) Was anything said about the time when you would get to it? - (A.) No, not that I remember." And then follows a good deal about Mr. Moody and his calculation.
So that your Lordship sees that that conversation with the Captain referred to the two things, the two indications they would get if they came across an iceberg - the one was the white fringe on the top even though the dark side of the iceberg were turned towards them, they would see the white light over the top from the other side, it being crystalline and white from exposure to the weather. They did not get that because this was a quite black berg. The other indication was the indication from the breaking of the water at the foot of the berg, that they would have if there were wind, and that they would have too, in a less degree, if there were a swell. They knew there was no wind, and they discussed that it was unlucky, because that would have accentuated it.
The Commissioner: This conversation reads to me as if they knew there would be no breaking of water on the base of the iceberg.
Sir Robert Finlay: That is quite inconsistent with a great deal of the other evidence, my Lord; it is quite inconsistent with what Mr. Lightoller said on the previous page.
The Commissioner: Naturally you would not see the water breaking if there was no wind.
Sir Robert Finlay: Will your Lordship look at what he said on the previous page, at Question 13569: "Of course, the stronger the breeze the more visible will the ice be, or rather the breakers on the ice. Therefore, at any time when there is a slight breeze you will always see at nighttime a phosphorescent line round a berg, growler, or whatever it may be; the slight swell which we invariably look for in the North Atlantic causes the same effect, the break on the base of the berg, so showing a phosphorescent glow."
The Commissioner: Then why were they discussing the absence of wind if they believed there was a swell as you say they did at that time; and if the swell would have produced the same effect on the bottom of the berg, why was it material to discuss the question of the absence of wind?
Sir Robert Finlay: That brings us back to the consideration which comes up every time. We have not here Captain Smith to give us what was in his mind, but one can, I think, see what Mr. Lightoller meant. If there were wind there would be a much more marked ripple, phosphorescent light at the foot of the berg, than if you had only a swell; but if you had a swell there would be that light, enough to give warning. It would not be nearly so marked as if there was wind. I do most respectfully put it to your Lordship that that is the effect of the evidence.
Now, will your Lordship kindly look at what Sir Ernest Shackleton says at the top of page 721. The earlier part of the answer relates to another matter. I am on Question 25063, the last sentence of which is at the top of page 721. Sir Ernest says, "Of course, that particular night was an abnormal night at sea in being a flat calm; it is a thing that might never occur again.
(Q.) That is what Mr. Lightoller says. You say apparently it is very rare to get such a flat calm as there was that night?"
The Attorney-General: That means there, a calm without a swell.
Sir Robert Finlay: Clearly; that is the whole point. "(A.) I only remember it once or twice in about 20 years' experience - the sea absolutely calm, without a swell, as it was recorded to have been."
The Commissioner: It is not an unknown thing according to Sir Ernest Shackleton; he says once or twice in 20 years. It appears to me that is a matter that a good sailor would take into consideration.
Sir Robert Finlay: But you must also take the other circumstance, that it is a black berg, all black.
The Commissioner: They had been discussing something which appears to me to have been very nearly the same as a black berg, that is to say, a berg presenting what they call its blue side.
Sir Robert Finlay: But there is this notable difference, that if it is a berg with a blue side, the other side is white.
The Commissioner: And they get the fringe?
Sir Robert Finlay: And you see the fringe. They were entitled to rely upon the overwhelming probability that they would have one or other of these indications even if the berg were turning its black side. Of course, the enormous probability was that the berg would be white, as it was described by men who have spent their lives in the Atlantic, who told your Lordship over and over again, many of them, that they saw a white berg, a great thing as white as that great white cartoon there. That is what they have seen. That is what in all but the rarest cases they do see. If they do by any chance see the blue side, the dark side of a berg which has been torn off, then they have the glimmer at the top. Here they did not have that, but they had the extraordinary combination of a totally black berg, with not even a swell to show the presence of the berg by the ripple that that would have produced - not nearly so strong as if there had been wind, but still quite strong enough to have given an indication.
I therefore most respectfully submit to your Lordship that it would not be right to find that there was anything blameworthy in following the practice which every man who has sailed the Atlantic for a long period past would have adopted.
That leads me to one other observation. My friend, the Attorney-General, I am told, said Mr. Ismay asserted it would be right to go on at the same speed. Mr. Ismay is most anxious that it should be made clear that he never intended to say anything of the kind, and when his answer is looked at, I submit it is clear he did not. I will not trouble your Lordship with it, because your Lordship said I need not trouble about it; but what Mr. Ismay, of course, means is this. This accident has revealed in the first place the encroachment of ice much further to the South; in the second place, it is brought home to every one that there may be this extraordinary combination of circumstances, and as regards the practice in the future it may very well be that your Lordship will think it right to recommend that that practice should be modified in the view of what has happened. What I do respectfully submit is that
Page 921
it is impossible to say there was anything blameworthy in the course that was taken by Captain Smith.
The Commissioner: I am much obliged to you, Sir Robert.
The Attorney-General: The questions to which my friend, Sir Robert, has been addressing himself are matters upon which I addressed you at length on Saturday, and the only one observation I desire to make in answer to my friend's remarks this morning is this: If you look at page 73, Question 2442, the evidence of Lee, one of the look-out men, you will see that there was the white fringe on the top, of which my friend was speaking.
Sir Robert Finlay: Oh, no, not at all.
The Attorney-General: It is really no good saying "not at all." I am going to read the question and answer.
Sir Robert Finlay: It is every good; when you have read it, you will see it is not.
The Attorney-General: I am not speaking of the ripple. This is not the ripple at the base of the berg; this what is at the top. "
(Q.) It was a dark mass that appeared, you say? - (A.) Through this haze, and as she moved away from it, there was just a white fringe along the top."
Sir Robert Finlay: Yes, but then you must take 2441 with it.
The Attorney-General: "Can you give us any idea of the breadth. What did it look like? It was something which was above the forecastle? - (A.) It was a dark mass that came through that haze and there was no white appearing until it was just close alongside the ship and that was just a fringe at the top.
(Q.) It was a dark mass that appeared, you say? - (A.) Through this haze, and as she moved away from it, there was just a white fringe along the top. That was the only white about it, until she passed by, and then you could see she was white; one side of it seemed to be black, and the other side seemed to be white. When I had a look at it going astern it appeared to be white."
The Commissioner: You must remember that the iceberg at this time was in the glare of the lights of the "Titanic."
Sir Robert Finlay: Yes, my Lord, the next question shows that: "At that time the ship would be throwing some light upon it; there were lights on your own ship? - (A.) It might have been that." I submit that entirely disproves my friend's view.
The Attorney-General: I am not dealing with that. With respect, it does not seem to me that what my friend has said this morning has in the slightest degree affected the view that was put before your Lordship, at least the argument that I addressed to you on Saturday, because all that my friend has said this morning, and, if I may say so, has said with all the force that he commands, only adds this, that there were these two abnormal or unusual conditions which I accepted on Saturday, when I argued the case before you, as the two abnormal conditions upon which my friend relied. They were all, however, matters which I dealt with then, and I agree with him that the result of the evidence shows that the excuse put forward must depend upon those two conditions. I analysed them then, and I do not propose to go into them at any further length. The only supplementary reference that I will make to what was said then, and I only make it because in consequence of what your Lordship said on the last occasion, I did not refer to the evidence upon it is this: My friend said to me just now, and said quite rightly - I call your Lordship's particular attention to it - that when Sir Ernest Shackleton is talking of a flat calm he means what I meant by a flat calm on Saturday when I referred to the evidence. I said a flat calm is a calm in which there is no swell. My friend agrees with me certainly, that when Sir Ernest Shackleton is speaking of it, that when he speaks of a flat calm -
Sir Robert Finlay: It is used in both senses.
The Attorney-General: I know it is, but it is no answer to the point I am making. I quite agree, and my friend is quite entitled to say that it may be when you speak of a flat calm in consequence of certain answers that Lightoller gave, that he is speaking there of a calm, a perfectly smooth sea, apparently presenting a flat surface, and nevertheless with a swell, and it may be he is speaking of it without a swell. It is a little difficult to tell, but he uses the expression "flat calm." Lightoller does in the first instance - it is his expression.
The Commissioner: And the Captain's expression.
The Attorney-General: Yes; as I said to my friend, Sir Robert Finlay, this morning, you observe that Sir Ernest Shackleton, who, at any rate, is a seaman, when he is speaking of a flat calm means what I suggest it does mean. There is all the difference in the world - at least I suggest it - between speaking of a calm and a flat calm. However, I do not want to lay too much stress upon the meaning of a particular phrase that is used in connection with it; all I want to show is that when he is speaking of a flat calm he must have in his mind that at least there must have been practically no movement although there might have been the slightest swell. That, I think, is the highest it can be put. And if there had been this very slight swell - I will concede in favour of Mr. Lightoller's proposition - that when he is speaking of a flat calm he means only with a slight swell - that would not have given any ripple upon the base of the berg upon which he would be entitled to rely as indicating to him at some distance ahead the presence of an iceberg.
That really exhausts what I desire to add upon that subject, and I will now address myself to the other point to which it is desirable that I should call your Lordship's attention. So far we have been dealing with the vessel up to the time of the report of the iceberg and the striking of the iceberg. It is unnecessary that I should call your Lordship's attention in any detail - so it occurs to me, but, of course, I will take any course your Lordship thinks right - as to what happened from the report by the look-out men of iceberg ahead and the striking of three bells and the telephone message, and then what happens on board the ship with the order to Hichens, the quartermaster; it is unnecessary that I should go into detail upon that, because I am accepting literally the evidence as it was given, and that you may treat the two things - that is, the sighting by the look-out man of the iceberg and by the officer in charge, Mr. Murdoch - as simultaneous. That is the fairest way, at any rate to Mr. Murdoch, to deal with it, that he saw it at the same time, and that immediately an order is given, "Hard-a-starboard," and if your Lordship will remember Mr. Moody's evidence, he said that she was hard-a-starboard, the helm right over, just as the impact took place.
One has to bear in mind, and I will only ask your Lordship to consider what all this means - that it has taken me pretty nearly three times as long to recapitulate this story as to what happened after the sighting of the iceberg as the actual occurrence took, as the actual time that elapsed between the sighting of the iceberg and the striking of the berg, which I say at most is 40 seconds.
What I mentioned just now is the evidence of what Hichens said that Moody had said. I said the evidence of Moody, but I did not mean that Moody had been called.
Now, my Lord, that brings us to consider what the effect of the collision was. Of course we have gone into that with considerable minuteness, having regard to its importance; we have examined the plans with the model and in particular with that large plan. Now that we have got it indicated as we have, your Lordship can see there on the section where exactly the wounds were inflicted, and I do not propose, unless you think it desirable (I am quite prepared to do it with references in detail to the actual evidence upon it, with the pages) to go into it.
The Commissioner: I do not think it will be useful.
The Attorney-General: No, my Lord. It did not seem so to me, because when you have located the spot there is very little importance in going through the evidence which tells you where the
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spot is which is now indicated on the section. Your Lordship will see that this ship, as she is veering to port under the starboard helm during this period of something like 40 seconds - because that is what it must be now; I am dealing with the wounds inflicted -strikes at about five places indicated on the section, and it is worth noting that she is considerably torn. I will indicate what they were. I have no doubt your Lordship has them well in mind, and I do not wish to dwell at any length upon the detail because I cannot conceive it will be of any assistance.
The Commissioner: No.
The Attorney-General: But what I want to do is to point out what the result of the whole
evidence is, beyond all question, and therefore it is unnecessary to dilate upon it at any length. In the first place you have a blow struck in the forepeak tank. There is an undoubted puncture of the skin there - penetration. Then you have it further in 1, 2 and 3 holds; you have that clearly proved. Then you have a very serious blow which was struck in the firemen's passage. That I say was very serious for this reason. Your Lordship will remember according to the evidence the blow struck there must have penetrated through the outer skin and through the inner skin of the firemen's passage and the distance between the inner skin and the outer skin at the nearest point was 3 feet 6 inches. So that one can form some conception of the force of the blow, and also of the penetration which must have taken place there if you realise that at least - we do not know the exact spot - 3 feet 6 inches of that ship was penetrated by some spur or something on that iceberg, which was under water; that is plain because otherwise you would not have got the blow struck which went right through the two skins and opened up that part of the firemen's passage through which, as your Lordship remembers, the water was coming in such great gushes.
Later we have the evidence also of the blow struck between No. 6 and No. 5 boiler sections. There again we have evidence which is very plain, at least as to this, that there were external wounds which were proved in the side of the vessel. They must have been struck outside and probably between the bulkheads, or at a distance, which penetrated both, before the after bulkhead of No. 6 section, and also abaft of it, and the consequence of that would be that as the blow struck the bulkhead as the ship struck like that, of course, it would hole both No. 5 and No. 6, and there is no doubt water came through that part in No. 6 and No. 5.
The only element of doubt that is left in the case as to actual penetration of the outer skin of the vessel is in No. 4 boiler section. We do not know really what happened there, and I do not think, as far as I am able to judge, anything in the evidence enables us to say, at any rate with any precision, what happened. What we do know is that water was rising there. That we have got quite clearly proved by the evidence. It is indicated on the plan that the blow was under the stokehold plates, and I think that must be plain also. The water was coming in under the stokehold plates, because your Lordship will remember it was rising there; we have very clear indications of that.
The Commissioner: I am reminded that it was something like an hour and three quarters before they were driven out of that stokehold by the water.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: It seems to support the suggestion that the water came over the top and then found its way down into the bunker, and then gradually rose from the bunker so as to rise above the plates.
The Attorney-General: No doubt that is a possible view, but I think the evidence shows the water was rising above the plates.
The Commissioner: Yes, but an hour and three-quarters afterwards; it was that that drove the men away.
The Attorney-General: After a time, yes.
The Commissioner: It is suggested that it was so long after the collision that the water was found coming up above the plates, that the probability is the water found its way from the top and went down into the bunker and filled the bunker, and then rose.
The Attorney-General: That depends on the evidence of Dillon and Cavell.
The Commissioner: However, I do not think you need dwell upon it.
The Attorney-General: I quite appreciate it may be so; it is well to bear it in mind, because no doubt the result of the evidence shows that eventually, as the water was rising, the firemen were driven out of that particular section, and they had to get up the escape in order to get clear. I do not think that it is of very great importance, because we know certainly from Mr. Wilding's evidence that, supposing you stop at the wound inflicted in No. 5 boiler section, and do not travel further aft than that, it is quite sufficient, apparently, to show that with the wounds that there were, the vessel was irretrievably doomed; that is quite plain. The only question is how long she would float.
The Commissioner: What is your theory as to the number of sections filled with water at the time she sank?
The Attorney-General: At the time she plunged down?
The Commissioner: Yes, at the time of the foundering.
The Attorney-General: According to Mr. Wilding's view - I am speaking from his view - I do not profess to be able to say anything, except what is based upon his evidence to your Lordship - according to him the water must by that time have got as far aft as the reciprocating-engine room. That I think is shown by the plan which he handed up to you with the coloured pencil upon it, because the doors are open by that time, your Lordship will remember.
The Commissioner: Yes.
The Attorney-General: The watertight doors are open. It is not as if you could say the watertight doors are all closed and then up to a certain section you get the water coming in, because your Lordship will remember once the water gets over the bulkheads and begins to flow in, - these watertight doors were open all the way aft.
Mr. Laing: They all shut mechanically.
The Attorney-General: Only with the float, yes - but that is as the water rises.
The Commissioner: There is, of course, the automatic effect of the rising waters upon the doors.
The Attorney-General: Yes, the float we have heard about; that is quite right. Assuming that operated, and I see no reason to doubt it (there is no evidence to show it failed and I do not see why it should), it certainly would have the effect of closing the door before the water got above the stokehold plates. That I have seen put into operation, and I have no doubt your Lordship did, upon the "Olympic."
The Commissioner: That does not answer my question. How many sections do you think were filled at the time she foundered?
The Attorney-General: I put it up to No. 4.
The Commissioner: Inclusive?
The Attorney-General: Yes, because the water is rising there your Lordship sees, and when we have got to No. 4 the water was rising, quite clearly and drove the men up. It got up to their knees and drove them away.
The Commissioner: That means to say that this vessel, which was constructed to float with any two compartments filled, did float until four had practically been filled. That is what it comes to?
The Attorney-General: Yes. May I add this to it, my Lord, that, according to Mr. Wilding's evidence - your Lordship has those who are more familiar than ever we can hope to be, after a lifelong study of these questions - but as I follow Mr. Wilding's evidence the effect was this, that, loaded as she was at the time she sailed on this voyage, she would have floated with three compartments filled. That is what he said, and I see no reason to doubt it. She was constructed, as
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your Lordship will remember, to float with any two adjoining compartments flooded - that is not unimportant and when so flooded she would have floated with the waterline 2 1/2 to 3 feet below the height of the bulkheads. That is the position. That is what the design was with the vessel loaded in a certain way; but he pointed out that, loaded as she was at that particular time for that particular voyage, although she was not designed for that purpose, she would actually have floated with three compartments flooded.
The Commissioner: That is to say, she was lighter in the water?
The Attorney-General: Yes. Your Lordship will remember - I only give the reference in passing - this is all dealt with by Mr. Wilding at page 515. He explains his view and how the water overcame the vessel, and how it was that she sank. It is all dealt with very well, and your Lordship will remember he gave us a very graphic explanation of it.
I think the result quite clearly, beyond controversy, of this evidence is this, that no height of bulkheads would have saved that vessel, holed as she was. I think that is established.
The Commissioner: It is said that if the bulkhead on the after-side of No. 5 boiler section had been taken higher it would have prevented the flooding of No. 4 boiler section, and the ship would either have floated, or have floated, at all events, longer than she did.
The Attorney-General: That, assumes, of course, that there is no injury to No. 4. That assumes that.
The Commissioner: Yes, it does.
The Attorney-General: Yes, it must.
The Commissioner: It really comes to this, that if No. 4 boiler section was holed, no bulkhead would have saved the ship.
The Attorney-General: That is it.
The Commissioner: But if No. 4 boiler section was not holed, and the bulkhead aft of No. 5 boiler section would have saved the ship or kept her longer afloat if it had been carried higher.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: I think that was admitted by Mr. Wilding.
The Attorney-General: Yes, I agree; he deals with it at page 518.
The Commissioner: If this part of the case is really important - I do not know that it is - it is important to ascertain as nearly as we can whether No. 4 was holed or not.
The Attorney-General: Yes. That depends upon the evidence of Dillon and Cavell. Dillon's evidence begins at page 98. He is the trimmer. He gives evidence, first of all, about opening the watertight doors after they had been closed, with which I am not going to trouble you, because that is quite clear in your Lordship's mind. Then at page 100, Question 3817, we get, I think, to the point which is material upon the question we are now examining. Perhaps I had better read a question or two before to introduce it: "Did you see any water before you went up in any of the boiler rooms or the engine room? - (A.) Yes, there was water coming in forward.
(Q.) The furthest point forward you reached was No. 4 boiler section? - (A.) Yes.
(Q.) Was it coming in there? - (A.) Yes.
(Q.) Where was it coming in? - (A.) Coming from underneath.
(Q.) From underneath the floor? - (A.) Yes.
(Q.) And from what part of the floor, the forward part or the afterpart? - (A.) The forward part.
(Q.) Did it come in large quantities or only in small quantities? - (A.) Small quantities.
(Q.) Was there any depth of water standing on the floor? - (A.) No.
(Q.) Do you mean the floor was just damp? - (A.) That is all.
(Q.) And it seemed to be coming through the floor? - (A.) Yes.
(Q.) Did you see any coming through the side of the ship at all? - (A.) I never noticed.
(Q.) Was there any water anywhere else in any of the other sections? - (A.) No.
(Q.) Then you got this order about a quarter-past 1, and you went up on deck."
If you look also at Questions 3810 and 3811, just preceding those, there is evidence of the time which your Lordship commented upon just now: "Can you give us any idea of how long it was after the ship had struck that you got the order to go on deck? - (A.) Yes.
(Q.) About how long was it? - (A.) An hour and 40 minutes. (Q.) That would make it about 1 o'clock? - (A.) No. (Q.) After that - a quarter-past one? - (A.) Yes."
Then Cavell is at page 107, Question 4247: "When you came back to No. 4, and you found the lights were on again, did you see any water in No. 4? - (A.) No. (Q.) When you got back to No. 4, do you remember hearing an order being given? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) What was it? - (A.) Draw fires. (Q.) Is that any part of a trimmer's work, , as a Rule? - (A.) In an emergency. (Q.) In an emergency you would do it, of course? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) And did you lend a hand to draw the fires in No. 4? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) And were they drawn ? - (A.) Partly drawn. (Q.) What would there be - 30 furnaces? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Were the firemen there helping to draw, too? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) You say they were only partly drawn? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) What happened then? - (A.) The water started coming up over her stokehold plates. (Q.) In No. 4? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Did that happen gradually or did it happen suddenly? - (A.) It came gradually. (Q.) The water - you moved your hand, you raised it; did it seem to come up from below? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) As far as you saw in No. 4, did any water come in from the side of the ship? - (A.) Not so far as I saw. (Q.) When the water came up through the plates what was done then? - (A.) We stopped as long as we could. (Q.) That is right? - (A.) And then I thought to myself it was time I went for the escape ladder. (Q.) They were still drawing the fires, these men, were they? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) How high did the water get above the plates they were standing on? How much water were they standing in before they left? - (A.) About a foot. (Q.) Working up to their knees? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Scraping the cinders out? - (A.) Yes." I think that is all the evidence there is.
The Commissioner: What that comes to, it appears to me, is this, that the water, as far as these two witnesses could tell, was not coming from the side of the ship.
The Attorney-General: Yes, neither of them certainly saw it coming from there.
The Commissioner: That looks as if that part of the ship was not holed, and if that part of the ship was not holed then that water that they saw must have come over the bulkhead.
The Attorney-General: Of course, there is another possibility which you must take into account, that they are standing on the plates; they would not see whether the water was coming in below the plate; they would not see whether the water was coming in at the side of the ship below the plate.
The Commissioner: No, their impression is apparently - that is all I can say - that the water was not coming in from the side of the ship. That seems to me to show if their impression is a well-formed impression that that part of the ship was not holed. I quite agree it is speculation, because that part of the ship might be holed and might have been holed below the plates on which they were standing.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: But they do not seem to have thought there was any water coming in from the side of the ship, and if it was not it must have been coming in over the bulkhead.
The Attorney-General: I do not think really that is the effect of the evidence, with all respect. Look at what Cavell said. I do not know that it is of any importance, but if it is -
The Commissioner: It is only important upon this question whether the ship would have been saved by having a higher bulkhead.
The Attorney-General: Yes, but it is a question you will not have to decide.
The Commissioner: I do not think it is necessary to decide that.
The Attorney-General: I rather understood that you were not going to decide that.
The Commissioner: But if I am to give a description as well as I can of the circumstances which sent this ship down to the bottom, I should have to consider that, I think.
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The Attorney-General: All I want to observe with reference to it is this: If your Lordship notices the form of the question which is put to both witnesses, Dillon and Cavell, and the answer, what they are asked is whether they saw water coming in.
The Commissioner: And what you say is she may have been holed all the same.
The Attorney-General: Quite; the water was coming up the stokehold plates.
The Commissioner: And the hole might have been beneath the plates from which they saw water coming up.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: All I mean is the answer "We saw no water coming in from the side," that probably meant they did not believe the ship was holed in the side at that place. It is pointed out to me, it is of no importance unless it is maintained that putting the bulkhead higher would not have saved the ship or prolonged the life of the ship.
The Attorney-General: I am going to point out the position we are in with regard to it. I will deal with it at once, because it will be an answer to what your Lordship was putting. That part of the case as to whether it is desirable to carry the bulkheads higher or whether it is desired to have a watertight deck, so far as I understood from what your Lordship said at an early period, is a part of the case which you do not intend to deal with; that is to say, that you do not intend to make any specific recommendation with regard to that. Your Lordship's view, as I follow it, is that there is a Special Committee which has been appointed for the purpose of considering the spacing and construction of the watertight compartments, and as I followed your Lordship's view, it was that you could not and would not go into that matter in this Enquiry; it would take a very long time, and necessitate naturally the examination of a great many witnesses in order to enable you to deal with it; but no doubt, if you thought right, your Lordship would make some general recommendation with regard to that. I presume, of course, I am only stating now what occurs to me with regard to it - that your Lordship would ask the Committee to deal with those two questions into which we have examined, in some little detail, without arriving at some conclusion in consequence of the view your Lordship did take.
The Commissioner: I am thinking of the description which I may have to give of the circumstances which brought the ship down to the bottom of the sea, and one of the things I must consider, I think, is whether the water in No. 4 came from the hole in the side of the ship, or whether it came over the bulkhead.
The Attorney-General: I quite follow for that purpose it would be necessary.
The Commissioner: It is for the Committee to say whether it is desirable that the bulkhead should be necessary.
The Attorney-General: I quite agree, my Lord, it would be necessary.
The Commissioner: As far as I can go, I must make up my mind upon the question whether No. 4 was holed or not. But you will remember this - if the evidence is so vague and uncertain that I cannot form any opinion upon the question which will be of any value, I shall say so.
The Attorney-General: I was going to say this, my Lord, and I will leave it with this observation: That so far as I am able to gather from the evidence, there is not sufficient to make it clear - I suggest to your Lordship, and one must be clear about it before coming to a conclusion - whether or not she was holed in No. 4. There is not sufficient to make it clear. I believe really that is the true effect of the evidence. I certainly cannot say that it is made clear that she was holed, because there is not any evidence of that. But from what we know of the water rising it is quite possible that she was holed below, and therefore that nobody would have seen it, and there is no evidence before you to explain it. I submit that is how the matter stands.
Now, my Lord, I do not propose to dwell any further upon that part of the case. I want to deal at once with the steps that were taken after the collision. We have proceeded by stages, first of all, of the vessel approaching the iceberg, then she struck the iceberg, she has been injured, and now I want to see what steps were taken after that. That involves a consideration in the main of two matters - one is what was done with regard to the watertight doors and the other is with regard to the boats. Substantially those are the two questions. There are minor points, but of no real importance because certainly they had no effect whatever upon the saving of life.
Now, my Lord, in the first instance, as to the closing of the watertight doors. I think the evidence is fairly clear and establishes this, that immediately after the impact the watertight doors were closed from the bridge in a way with which your Lordship has become familiar, and I also have become familiar, on the "Olympic." These watertight doors were closed, and it is equally clear that these watertight doors were opened some time after from No. 4 aft so as to enable a suction pipe to be brought from the aftermost tunnel. Those doors I was just referring to, are those which would no doubt have been closed, so far as one is able to judge, when the water rose sufficiently high by means of the float to liberate the clutch and allow the door to drop down again. I will assume that was done. The only other questions which have arisen as to watertight doors are as to those doors on decks E and F. There has been a good deal of question with regard to that, and, of course, I can give you what happened - the evidence in detail - with reference to that. But so far as I have followed all the criticism that has been directed to what happened afterwards, no complaint was made, if I understand aright, by my friend Mr. Edwards, who specially dealt with the question of bulkheads, and watertight doors, with regard to these two decks after the examination that we have had. And it seems fairly plain that those doors were closed. It is gone into by the witnesses up to a point that the emergency doors were opened and that there was access along the alleyway.
As your Lordship is going to deal with the history of what was done, I will just give your Lordship the reference to it. I do not think it is of sufficient importance for me to dwell upon it in detail , but I will state shortly what happened, and give you the pages and questions. At page 236, Brown, in Question 10669 to 10672, says that the first order he got after he was wakened by the shock was to close all the watertight doors. That is what first happens: "Did you hear an order given in the alleyway about the watertight doors? - (A.) That was the first order I heard after I was woke by the shock. (Q.) Just tell us what you heard? - (A.) Who gave it I do not know, but I heard an order in the alleyway outside our quarters, to close all watertight doors. (Q.) There are watertight doors in the alleyway? - (A.) Yes, lower down, further aft than our quarters are. (Q.) And you heard that order given? - (A.) Yes.
Then, Mackay, on page 236, Questions 10691 to 10694 - he was the bath room steward - says: "The first order I heard was from the second steward to close all watertight doors on F deck.
The Commissioner: These references were all given to me by Sir Robert Finlay.
The Attorney-General: All I wanted to do was to show your Lordship what had happened. I do not want to go through them, because I attribute very little importance to this part of the evidence.
The Commissioner: I have them all marked.
The Attorney-General: Very well, my Lord. I am very glad because it will save me dealing with it. The conclusion of the whole matter is in Wilding's evidence on page 517, and that is the only evidence your Lordship need be troubled with.
The Commissioner: I will see whether I have that reference.
The Attorney-General: I have no doubt your Lordship has it. It has been referred to several times. At Question 20360 you get the conclusion of the matter and I only call attention to it because it
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does summarise what had happened. He is asked: "Does it throw any light to your mind upon the question of whether the watertight doors in the bulkheads were or were not shut." That is on the question of the wounds and how long she floated, and he says, "No." The same scale, if I may so use it, of the sinking is not sufficiently definite, because closing the watertight doors between E and F deck would only have made a delay of a few minutes, perhaps five or ten minutes. The evidence is not accurate enough upon that. That is really the substance of the matter.
I would like to make one observation in passing, not so much to bring it to your Lordship's notice, as because I know some comment has been made with regard to it. There is no question in this case but were the pumping arrangements were satisfactory and worked satisfactorily. Your Lordship will remember we began to go into it and it was made quite clear that there was no complaint about it, and therefore your Lordship thought it was unnecessary to go into it, and also that you were satisfied, and those who were assisting you, that the pumping arrangements were satisfactory; so that we need not deal in any detail with that. No question was put to your Lordship with regard to it.
But what I do want to address myself to now, in dealing with the steps that were taken immediately after the collision, is how soon after the collision it was realised that the injury or injuries were very serious.
The Commissioner: How soon it was realised?
The Attorney-General: Yes. My view of the evidence which I submit for your Lordship's consideration, is that it was realised immediately, or almost immediately, by the Captain.
The Commissioner: Within 20 minutes.
The Attorney-General: Yes, certainly, within 20 minutes, but I think one might even say within a shorter time; but it is sufficient to say within 20 minutes certainly, by the Captain and by the Chief Engineer, by Mr. Andrews, who represented the builders, by those, of course, who spoke to Mr. Andrews who were only taking his view, and by Mr. Ismay himself. The only importance of that is to show that we do get from Mr. Ismay's questions to the Captain and to the Chief Engineer within a short time after the impact, conversations which show what their view was of the injury. I will not trouble your Lordship with references to it, because I have no doubt it is present to your Lordship's mind. It is stated really in a couple of sentences. The effect of it was that the Captain said, "It is very serious." The effect from the conversations with the Chief Engineer was: "It is very serious; I hope that I may be able to keep it under with the pumps." That is how it stands. And, of course, there is further evidence of the conversations with Mr. Andrews, to which reference has been made, but which indicate, in any event, that he put the life of the vessel at the moment that he was asked as 1 1/2 hours only. I am taking the extreme view. According to one witness he said half an hour, but according to another witness he said an hour-and-a-half, and I will take the longer time.
There are just a few passages upon it to which I wish to direct your Lordship's attention. Mr. Lightoller says that he realised that it was serious when Mr. Boxhall came to him half an hour after the impact and told him that the water was up to F deck. That is at page 310, Questions 13784 to 13791. My friend the Solicitor-General says: "Time is very difficult to calculate, especially when you are trying to go to sleep, but seriously, do you think it was half an hour? - (A.) That I was in my bunk after that? (Q.) Yes? - (A.) Well, I did not think it was half an hour, but we have been talking this matter over a very great deal, and I judge it is half an hour, because it was Mr. Boxhall who came to inform me afterwards we had struck ice, and previous to him coming to inform me, as you will find out in his evidence, he had been a considerable way round the ship on various duties, which must have taken him a good while. It might be less, it might be a quarter of an hour. You will be able to form your judgment. (Q.) He is the Fourth Officer? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) How would his time of duty run? - (A.) He was on duty till 12 o'clock. (Q.) 10 to 12? - (A.) 8 to 12. (Q.) It was Mr. Boxhall who came to your room and gave you the information? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) What was it he told you? - (A.) He just came in and quietly remarked, 'You know we have struck an iceberg.' I said, 'I know we have struck something.' He then said, 'The water is up to F deck in the mail-room.' (The Commissioner.) Well, that was rather alarming, was it not? - (A.) He had no need to say anything further then, sir."
The Commissioner: By F deck he meant G deck; is not that so?
The Attorney-General: Yes, that is quite right.
The Solicitor-General: Yes, it was cleared up afterwards. He said Boxhall did say F deck, but he meant G deck.
The Attorney-General: Then at page 316, Mr. Pitman says, at Questions 14931 to 14956: "(Q.) You were aroused, and at first did you think much had happened? - (A.) No, I did not. (Q.) What was it aroused you; was it a noise, or a jar, or what? - (A.) A noise; I thought the ship was coming to anchor. (Q.) Did you lie on in your bunk for some few minutes? - (A.) I did. (Q.) At the end of those few minutes did you do anything? - (A.) Yes, I went on deck. (Q.) Was that curiosity, or what took you there? - (A.) Yes, I suppose it was. (Q.) Getting on deck, what did you see or hear? - (A.) I saw nothing and heard nothing. (Q.) Did you go to the forward part of the navigation bridge? - (A.) No, I only just went outside the quarters." It comes a little later: I will leave out the intervening part. Question 14948 is: "(Q.) While you were dressing did you receive any information? - (A.) Mr. Boxhall came to my room and said the mail room was afloat. (Q.) How long do you think had elapsed between the time you were aroused and Mr. Boxhall coming and telling you this? - (A.) I should think it must be 20 minutes. (Q.) Did he give you any information as to what had caused the mail-room to be afloat? - (A.) Yes; I asked him what we had struck, and he said an iceberg. (Q.) After that did you quickly proceed with your dressing? - (A.) Yes, I put my coat on and went on deck. (Q.) When you got on deck, did you see anything being done? - (A.) The men were uncovering the boats."
Then Mr. Boxhall, at page 361, Questions 15607 to 15613.
The Commissioner: I have read all you want to read on the subject: "Mr. Andrews tells me he gives her from an hour to an hour and a half" to live.
The Attorney-General: Yes, that is the passage I was going to refer to. I do not think it is worth calling your Lordship's attention to what another witness said because I am taking the longest time. You will remember one witness said Mr. Andrews only gave it half an hour. That was Hemming.
The Commissioner: On what page is that?
The Attorney-General: It is at the bottom of page 421. The actual passage is on 422, at Questions 17738 to 17741.It starts at the bottom of page 421. "Shortly after that, did you" that is Hemming, the lamp trimmer - "see the boatswain? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) What did he say to you? - (A.) He told us to turn out; that the ship had half an hour to live, from Mr. Andrews; but not to tell anyone, but to keep it to ourselves. (Q.) I did not hear what you said about Mr. Andrews? - (A.) The boatswain told us to turn out; the ship had only half an hour to live, from Mr. Andrews, but not to tell anyone. The boatswain heard it from Mr. Andrews, and he told us. (The Commissioner.) When was this; how long after the jar which you heard? - (A.) About 10 minutes, I should say."
The Commissioner: That brings it nearer to what you were saying; I said 20 minutes.
The Attorney-General: Yes, I think 10 minutes is the time, on the evidence. One may say within 10 minutes they knew it.
Then there is Mr. Lowe at page 366, Questions 15791 to 15794. This concludes the evidence of the officers upon this point, I think: "(Q.) Just tell us what woke you up? - (A.) I was half awakened by hearing voices in our quarters, because it is an
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unusual thing, and it woke me up. I suppose I lay down there for a little while until I fully realised, and then I jumped out of bed and opened my door a bit, and looked out, and I saw ladies in our quarters with lifebelts on. (Q.) When you first looked out people had got their lifebelts on? - (A.) They had. (Q.) Do you know the time? - (A.) I do not. I have not the remotest idea of the time right throughout. (Q.) Were the boats being attended to?" - this marks the time - "(A.) As soon as I looked out through the door I jumped back and got dressed and went out on deck, and the boats were being cleared."
Now, I have exhausted the officers' evidence upon it, and at page 442 you find the passage I recalled to your Lordship's recollection in Mr. Ismay's evidence, Question 18513 - Captain Smith was there - "Did you ask him anything further" - he is dealing there with Captain Smith. Perhaps your Lordship will look at 18509. - "(A.) I went back to my room and I put a coat on, and I went up on to the bridge. (Q.) Was Captain Smith there? - (A.) He was. (Q.) Then did you ask him what had happened? - (A.) I did. (Q.) And what did he tell you? - (A.) He told me we had struck ice. (Q.) Did you ask him anything further? - (A.) I asked him whether he thought the damage was serious, and he said he thought it was. (Q.) What did you do then? - (A.) I then went downstairs again - down below. (Q.) Did you meet Mr. Bell, the Chief Engineer? - (A.) I met the Chief Engineer at the top of the staircase. (Q.) Did you have some conversation with him? Will you tell us what it was? - (A.) I asked him whether he thought the ship was seriously damaged and he said he thought she was, but, as far as I remember, he thought the pumps would control the water." Then I read to him the question and the answer which he had given in the American evidence: "'(A.) He said he thought the damage was serious, but that he hoped the pumps would be able to control the water? - (A.) I do not know whether he said 'he hoped' or 'he thought'; it is to the best of my recollection. I cannot remember every word he said.'" That is how it stands.
Now, of course, there is some importance to be attributed to that from two aspects. The one is as to what steps were taken by those on board and the time that it took them to get the boats away with the passengers on board; and the other is because of some criticism which has been directed to the omission of the Captain and officers to inform the passengers that the danger was so serious. I mean, there are those aspects upon which this evidence is material.
The first thing that I want to say with reference to it is that the uncovering of the boats, clearing the boats for use, and getting them ready to put into the water does seem to have taken a long time. Your Lordship will remember how the evidence stands upon this. There are other considerations to be taken into account in determining whether or not there was too much time occupied in clearing the boats; but one has to remember this, that the order to lower the boats was given within some 20 minutes of the impact, which would bring us to 12 o'clock. In point of fact, no boat was lowered at the earliest till 12.45. That was boat No. 7.
Mr. Laing: The order to uncover, you mean; you said to lower.
The Attorney-General: Yes, quite right; my friend is quite right; the order to uncover, and subsequently the order to lower. But the first boat lowered, so far as we are able to gauge from the evidence, is at 12.45; that is boat No. 7. Of course, by that time, as your Lordship observes, more than an hour had elapsed. She struck at 11.40 and the first boat is put into the water at 12.45. No doubt there are those who will assist your Lordship who are more familiar with the time that it ought to take to get a boat ready and to lower into the water in an emergency such as this than I, but it does strike one as a long time.
The Commissioner: What is the significance of it?
The Attorney-General: In this case?
The Commissioner: Yes.
The Attorney-General: So far as it affects the loss of life in this case, I do not think it is of any significance.
The Commissioner: It had no effect at all. They managed, before the ship went down, to get all of the boats out.
The Attorney-General: I am not sure but what I was a little hasty in saying "no effect," because, after all, one has to remember there was a difficulty in getting the last collapsible boat out.
The Commissioner: Yes, I remember that very well, and perhaps an exception ought to be made in reference to the last collapsible boat; but why should we trouble ourselves about enquiring into that, unless, indeed, I want to enquire into the boat drills these men had gone through.
The Attorney-General: Of course, that does open up a somewhat wide question which I should be prepared to take your Lordship's view about. Although it is quite true that it may be said, or I will assume it may be said, that the fact that it took a long time did not result in any loss of life - I will assume that for the purpose; and I will assume also that the fact that they had no boat drill did not result in any loss of life - I have got something to say about it - but I say I will assume it, the question is whether your Lordship, notwithstanding that, in view of the facts you have had brought before you, would think it necessary to make some recommendation, for example, with regard to boat drill which would affect both the considerations which I am now putting to you. The suggestion I am going to make is that if that had been the effect of boat drill, it never would have taken so long to discover the boats or to lower them.
The Commissioner: Whether it would have taken longer or not to lower them there ought to have been boat drill.
The Attorney-General: I quite agree, if you arrive at the fact that there ought to be boat drill, which is impressed upon one from the evidence.
The Commissioner: I do not think at present it would have made the least difference in the time that they took to get the boats down into the water. It does not affect the question of lowering. There ought to be boat drill.
The Attorney-General: Certainly.
The Commissioner: There is no doubt about that.
The Attorney-General: I do not think it is suggested that there is.
The Commissioner: Luckily in this case it did not matter because, subject to the comment about the loss of the collapsible boats, you could get all the boats into the water.
The Attorney-General: Yes. I am going to say something to your Lordship about the boat drill before I leave the case, but I pass from it at the moment I only want to call attention to the fact of the time that was taken. I certainly do not want to spend any time upon it if your Lordship has made up your mind that there should be boat drill. That is the only point to which I was going to direct my criticisms upon the time taken. Curiously enough under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1906 there is a provision that there must be an entry in the logbook of the boat drill and a penalty for not entering it; I think it is Section 9, but there is no statutory provision that you must hold a boat drill. That is how the law stands at present upon it. It is Section 9 of the Act of 1906. An entry must be made by the Master in the official logbook of every occasion on which boat drill is practiced on board the ship and on which the life-saving appliances on board the ship have been examined for the purpose of seeing that those appliances are fit and ready for use. The Master shall, if and when required by any officer of the Board of Trade, produce for inspection any record kept by him for the purposes of this Section. If the Master of a ship fails to comply with any requirement of this Section he shall be liable on summary conviction for each offence to a fine not exceeding £10."
The Commissioner: What section is that?
The Attorney-General: Section 9 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1906. What it amounts to is that if there is boat drill, it must be entered in
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the logbook and if it is not entered in the log a penalty ensues.
The Commissioner: There is no provision that there must be boat drill.
The Attorney-General: No, that is a point to which I shall direct attention by and by. Parliament at any rate has only provided a penalty for not entering it in the log, but we do know this with regard to boat muster for boat drill: The Emigration Officer called Clarke in this case at Southampton did make, and is in the habit of making, a requirement that boats shall be put into the water - that is, for the purpose of giving his certificate. My Lord, obviously, I should say, that that is not sufficient, because all that that amounts to is picking out two boats which are manned by seamen and put into the water just for the purpose of seeing, as I should imagine, that the davits and tackle are in order and that the boat can be lowered -
The Commissioner: And that the boats were sound.
The Attorney-General: Yes; that is all it comes to; but, really, it is not of very great practical value, because you would never get your boats manned as they were on these two occasions and lowered full of seamen. What you have to remember is that when the boats have to be lowered at sea there are the proper number of firemen and trimmers and stewards to man them when they are lowered.
The Commissioner: Are you going to suggest that it should have been incumbent on the officers of this ship to have taken part in the boat drill, because, if you did, you would produce a state of things that would be almost impossible.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: All you want is eight or nine of the men.
The Attorney-General: I do not think there is any great difficulty in it. There is a boat muster which, in the ordinary course, would have been held on board this ship; it would have been held on the Sunday, apparently; it was never held before the vessel started. It is not a boat drill, but it has some of the elements of a boat drill, and that is what took place, apparently.
The Commissioner: It enables the men to be mustered ready for action in an emergency, but they get no practice in the lowering of the boats.
The Attorney-General: I agree, but it gets them there, and it tells each man what his place is in the boat; that is the object of it. Each man would know his boat, and know where he is to go in the boat, and there it ends, and after all, the ship is travelling at the time, and there is no question of lowering the boats into the water and practicing; they cannot do that, but it has just that element in it which is of itself of some importance.
The Commissioner: Must every man of the thousand who constitute the crew take part in lowering the boats, or is it confined to the deckhands?
The Attorney-General: Yes, the seamen.
The Commissioner: I am told that at a boat muster the boats are swung out.
The Attorney-General: Yes, swung out, but not lowered.
The Commissioner: I do not think it is suggested that when they get out into the ocean the boats are lowered.
The Attorney-General: No, because the vessel is travelling at 22 knots at the time, but they are swung out, certainly; I think we have heard something about that.
Mr. Cotter: My experience of 18 years is that the men get a boat badge, and the number of the boat is on the badge; for instance, No. 2 lifeboat would be on the badge, and the man would have to go to No. 2. A bugle goes, and they know by the bugle, and they go to their boat stations, and the order goes, "All hands to the deck." The men stand by the boats, and the officer in charge of the boat has a small book, with the list of names of that boat in that book, and he calls out the names of the men, and each man has to reply what he is, whether he is a fireman, steward, or cook; every man has to answer to his name. The officer who is in charge of the drill gives the order so many men in the boats; there are eight men told off for a boat; each seat in the boat is numbered. No. 1 is a sailor, No. 2 is a fireman, No. 3 is a steward, No. 4 is a fireman, No. 5 is a sailor, No. 6 is a steward, and No. 7 and No. 8 is a sailor and fireman. That makes three stewards, three firemen and two sailors in a boat. The sailors' duty is chiefly to look after the falls and tackles; then order for swinging out the boats comes, and the whole of the men, the spare men, stand by, and launch the boats out. They may lower some right down to the water's edge.
The Commissioner: Do you mean out at sea?
Mr. Cotter: No; this is only done in port, and that is how the men get knowledge of how to handle the boats. This is done regularly in the Cunard Line, both in New York and in Liverpool.
The Commissioner: Do all the stewards take part in that?
Mr. Cotter: Every steward, every fireman and every sailor.
The Commissioner: Then 900 men take part in it.
Mr. Cotter: Yes, 900 men.
The Commissioner: Do the 900 men take part in this work in the boats?
Mr. Cotter: Not in the boats, but in the handling of the boat drill.
The Commissioner: Nine hundred men take part in the handling.
Mr. Cotter: Yes.
The Commissioner: All the stewards?
Mr. Cotter: Yes, the stewards, the sailors and the firemen.
The Commissioner: Supposing the firemen will not come on board till just within a few minutes of the boat being launched, what happens then?
Mr. Cotter: It is a bad system to have in any case in any company. That has happened in the case of the White Star Line, but in the Cunard Line it does not happen.
The Commissioner: I am not sure about that.
Mr. Cotter: I am positive.
The Commissioner: I doubt whether there is any big difference between the Cunard Line and the White Star Line.
Mr. Cotter: There is a big difference, my Lord; I have sailed in both.
The Commissioner: Now, Mr. Attorney, will you proceed.
The Attorney-General: My Lord, we have gone off the track a little. I was only going to say that I should hesitate a little to say that it is only the seamen who ought to take part in the boat drill. I should certainly hesitate to say that it is only seamen who ought to take part in the boat drill, but after all those are the men who least require the drill.
The Commissioner: Is it not the usual thing for those men to go through a course of boat drill?
The Attorney-General: No
The Commissioner: Does the Captain of the vessel ever go through boat drill?
The Attorney-General: I should imagine not, I do not suppose that he requires it.
The Commissioner: Does the head steward go through it?
The Attorney-General: I do not see why not, my Lord; I do not see why his degree of head steward should prevent him.
The Commissioner: But does he?
The Attorney-General: That I cannot say.
Mr. Cotter: Yes, he does, my Lord.
The Commissioner: I am told he does.
The Attorney-General: Well, that satisfactorily answers the question.
The Commissioner: I will tell you what I am advised about this, and that is, that in long voyages to the East, where you are at sea for several weeks, it can be done, but you cannot get through the whole of the crew, through the stewards and firemen and A. B.'s. you cannot get through them all; but when you are out on an Atlantic voyage which lasts only five days, is it practically impossible, and that you would have to do nothing else but working at the boats You could scarcely do it in five days, and you would have the people doing other work besides working at the boats.
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The Attorney-General: I suppose what it means is that you would have to do it the day before if you do it at all?
The Commissioner: Then you would want more officers and men?
The Attorney-General: That is the difficulty that has been pointed out to me.
The Commissioner: It is quite obvious it is desirable that there should be some sort of drill, and in this case, as far as I can make out, it is admitted there was none.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: There was this inspection of the two boats.
The Attorney-General: Yes, there was the inspection of the two boats in Southampton. Well, my Lord, that really was the object of the criticism that I was going to direct to the time taken up.
The Commissioner: Are you going to say anything to me as to the value of the boats?
The Attorney-General: Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner: They were very valuable on this occasion?
The Attorney-General: Yes, I am going to say that, but, of course, that comes to the other question which is involved, about the boat accommodation.
The Commissioner: But my own impression at present is that the collision happened in such a way that boats were not wanted.
The Attorney-General: I agree; and when I deal with that part of the case I shall say that has been the policy, not only of the Board of Trade, but of the Advisory Committee which has been sitting under the Merchant Shipping Act and giving expert advice to the Board of Trade, but I will come to that in the proper order when I come to deal with the boat accommodation required by the Board of Trade.
Now, my Lord, the point that I was upon just now about the clearing of the boats from the ship, and the time that was taken, proves this, that altogether (I do not think you can be precise) from about a quarter to one to half-past two o'clock was occupied in lowering the boats. There is this submission to be made in connection with that, that according, certainly, to Mr. Lowe's evidence, and some other evidence, the time taken was not because of any difficulty in handling the boats, but because they could not get the passengers to get into them, and no doubt that is a perfectly just observation which one must bear in mind that they seem to have had very great difficulty in getting the passengers to the boats, or, when there, to get them into the boats, but I shall not comment further upon that in view of what your Lordship has said, that you think there ought to be boat drill, as to my mind that is the only value of the evidence in this case, and I therefore will say nothing more about that part of it.
Now, my Lord, the second consideration, having regard to the seriousness of the casualty as realised between 10 minutes or at a very early period from this happening to which I have referred, was that it is said, if the passengers had been told of the extreme danger and that the vessel could not float for more than an hour and a half, or if they had known what Mr. Andrews had said as his opinion, or what the Captain had said as his opinion to Mr. Ismay, or the Chief Engineer, Mr. Bell, equally to Mr. Ismay, if they had known that, that they would have got into the boats, there would have been no difficulty. Of course, what would have happened no doubt would have been that they would have got into the boats; but I think, as your Lordship indicated, there would have been the gravest possible danger of panic at that time, and of a struggle to get into the boats, instead of the very orderly organisation and maneuvering that took place by the stewards getting in front, and asking the passengers and the women and children to get into the boats, carrying out the order of the Captain that women and children should be in the boats first; all that discipline which existed, one cannot help thinking, would have been prevented if they had been told that there was a serious danger, and I also should suggest that no passenger who knows that his vessel - I believe no passenger, however ignorant of the perils of the sea, who knows that his vessel has been in contact with an iceberg, and that an order is given that the boats to be uncovered and lowered, and women and children are to be allowed to get in first, would have failed to realise that there was at least a grave state of things on board that vessel. I only make those observations because of the criticisms which they have been made already upon this - I think in particular by Mr. Harbinson, who said they ought to have been told. My Lord, in this connection, as I am dealing with this, I would like to remind your Lordship of how the matter stands with regard to the third class passengers. It was said, certainly at the outset of this case, that the accessibility of the third class passengers to the boats was extremely difficult, that they could not get to the boats, and a suggestion was made that the greater percentage of the third class passengers drowned was due to the fact that they had not been able to get there and, indeed, at one time it was suggested, if not here, certainly it has been suggested by some statements which appeared in the Press, that they were prevented from getting to the boats - forcibly prevented. Well, my Lord, fortunately, very fortunately I think, all that suggestion is absolutely disposed of by the evidence that has been given. I am not going to refer to it now; I have collected it, and intended to call attention to it, because I did think it was a matter of very great importance; and the suggestion which was underlying many of the questions that were put, certainly by my friend Mr. Harbinson, was that the third class passengers had been worse treated in this matter than the first and second class passengers, particularly the first, and that that accounted for the greater loss of life among the third class passengers. My Lord, of course when one reflected upon the condition of things that that seemed to indicate, I think it was very distressing to think that that really was the fact. My Lord, we know from what Mr. Harbinson has said himself as the result of this evidence, and after the very zealous vigilance with which he has conducted his case on behalf of the third class passengers, whom he represented, he comes to the conclusion which I would just like to repeat to your Lordship, as disposing of a great mass of the evidence which has been given and as my excuse for not referring to it more in detail. He says, at page 781: "I wish to say distinctly that no evidence has been given in the course of this case that would substantiate a charge that any attempt was made to keep back the third class passengers. There is not an atom or a tittle of evidence upon which any such allegation could be based, and I do not for one moment say the third class passengers were deliberately kept back or were kept back at all in the sense that any effort was made to prevent them reaching the boat deck.
The Commissioner: What page is that?
The Attorney-General: 781. "I desire further, my Lord, to say that there is no evidence that when they did reach the boat deck there was any discrimination practiced either by the officers or the sailors in putting them into the boats. It would be wrong of me to say so, because there is no evidence which would bear me out in saying so, and I think it only fair, in speaking on behalf of the third class passengers, I should make that observation to your Lordship." Now, my Lord, in view of that statement by my learned friend, a statement which he very fairly, and, if I may say so, very properly made, having regard to the suggestions that certainly have been made public with regard to the third class passengers. I do not intend to go in any detail into the evidence. Your Lordship will remember that we went with great care in this case into the plans, and also, with Mr. Wilding's assistance, along the decks, in order to see whether or not the third class passengers had access to the decks, and we have had much discussion about the barricades, or the barriers, that existed on the vessel; at one time it looked as if it was possible that it might be suggested that it was those that prevented the third class passengers from getting on the deck. So far
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as the evidence goes it is quite plain that nothing of that kind took place. You have still to remember that there was a larger percentage of third class passengers drowned than of second or first class. My Lord, one reason that occurs to me, and that, I suggest, is worthy of consideration, is that these third class passengers were emigrants. They would probably almost, and they would certainly be carrying all they possessed with them. To leave the cabin or to leave the vessel with all their little property on board and to go into the boat would be a thing that they would naturally be loth to do, more loth probably than a person whose property was not all on the vessel, and who might be inclined to leave such little baggage as he had without any very serious consideration. When you bear in mind here that you have emigrants, and that you are dealing with emigrants, and that they were asked to leave and to get into the boat at a distance, no doubt, of some 65 feet, and to be lowered in these boats into the water, probably many of them never having been on a vessel before, and certainly not of a vessel of this character, I think one can readily understand why it is that the third class passengers refused to leave the ship, and remained on the ship in a larger number proportionately than either first or second class passengers. There is one other reason, not an unimportant one, which is of course that their quarters, according to the construction of the ship, were in a less favourable position undoubtedly for reaching the boats than either the first or second class passengers. That, I think, is quite clear from what we saw.
The Commissioner: Their quarters are at the extreme ends.
The Attorney-General: Yes, both forward and aft, and that must be borne in mind. Still, according to the evidence, stewards were told off and were sent to fetch them, and according to what you have before you they failed to get them to come on deck for the most part, or to attempt to get into the boats. Your Lordship may remember one particular piece of evidence, I think it was as to boat No. 15, the last boat on the starboard side, of which it was said that stewards were sent to get passengers, and sent down to see whether there were no women and children to come up from the third class to get into this last boat that was leaving on the starboard side, and then came back and apparently they found no one. I am bound to say that the evidence that was given with regard to that was not very satisfactory, and your Lordship will remember with regard to this last boat that as she was being lowered and as the passengers were getting into her it was then found that she could take more, and stewards were sent down to see whether they could find any third class passengers to come up on deck and get into the boat, and the answer was that they found none. I have always found that a little difficult to understand, because there were a very large number of third class passengers still on that vessel, and one does not realise why it was that no one came up on deck. To some extent you must bear in mind also that some of the emigrants were foreigners, but even then with regard to that the evidence is that interpreters were sent along to explain to them what it was that they were required to do. So that viewing the evidence in all its aspects, and bearing in mind what has been said by my learned friend Mr. Harbinson, I think what it resolves itself into eventually is that the third class passengers were more loth to leave their cabins and to get into the boats than the first class passengers seem to have been, or even the second class passengers; and further that they were not so favourably situated, and their cabins were not so favourably placed as either first or second class, but as far as I am able to gather anything from the evidence there is no other explanation of why it is that so many were lost. Your Lordship will remember the proportion is very striking.
The Commissioner: There were 560 third class, I think, in the vessel.
The Attorney-General: Yes, about. And, my Lord, the evidence with regard to it, both as to the access to the boat deck and as to what was done is all collected, but I am not sure whether your Lordship has got it. Some attention was directed to it undoubtedly by my learned friend Sir Robert Finlay, and in some detail, but whether your Lordship has all the information upon that which is available I am not quite certain.
The Commissioner: I do not think you need stop to examine it in any closer detail.
The Attorney-General: If you please, my Lord; then I will pass from it. It will save a good deal of time. Now, my Lord, I propose to deal with what happened with reference to the boats. I am not now upon the accommodation provided - that I propose to deal with when I come to the important part of the case that affects the Board of Trade. My Lord, the boats are dealt with in the boat list, of which your Lordship has the analysis before you, and if I may say so, it is done with such care and so well that I do not think I could usefully spend any time in attempting to amplify it. Your Lordship really has the substance of it there, and it is as well put as it can be.
The Commissioner: Mr. Attorney, which is the question to which you are directing my attention now? What is the number of it? Is it a specific question?
The Attorney-General: Yes, there is a specific question, of course, as to the capacity of the boating accommodation. I think really it comes into Questions 16, 17 and 19, and 20 is quite specific upon the point.
The Commissioner: Read me Question 20, please.
The Attorney-General: "What was the number of (a.) passengers, (b.) crew taken away in each boat on leaving the vessel? How was this number made up, having regard to, first, sex; second, class; third, rating? How many were children and how many adults? Did each boat carry it's full load, and, if not, why not?" But there are several questions that deal with the boats.
The Commissioner: Am I expected to take each boat separately and set out the circumstances relating to it? There is a question, I think, that asks me to do it.
The Attorney-General: You are asked this: How many passengers and crew left in each boat? That is all, I think.
The Commissioner: I can do it in a way, but not precisely, I am afraid.
The Attorney-General: I do not think anybody with the greatest care, even if we had much more evidence than we have, could be quite precise about it, but I do not think it is intended that you should do more than to give an indication according to the evidence of how many you think were carried in each boat.
The Commissioner: According to the evidence a great many more people were carried away in these boats than they were capable of carrying.
The Attorney-General: I quite agree, and that is particularly striking when you examine the proportions. I think as far as I have been able to analyse it, according to the evidence, we know in fact there were 711 persons saved in the boats; that is the full number. There were, according to the evidence, 836 carried in the boats, and who ought to have been saved if that number is right, and moreover, it shows quite plainly that the witnesses have been inclined to over-estimate the number of women and children who went away in each boat, and to under-estimate the number of male passengers that went away in the boats, as well as the number of the crew. That is exactly how it stands.
The Commissioner: Yes, that is exactly how it stands; there is an exaggeration in the gross number, and there is an exaggeration of the number of women and children.
The Attorney-General: Yes, the tendency undoubtedly has been for the witnesses who have been called to make out that more women and children were carried in the boats than were in fact carried, and a less number of men and crew. It is striking in particular with regard to the women and children, because in fact there were 388 saved of women and children; according to
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the evidence there were 642 women and children saved. In fact there were 126 male passengers saved; according to the evidence there were only 71. In fact there were 189 male crew saved; according to the evidence, only 123. So that bears out what your Lordship said as a summary. That is dealing with the total number saved as 703 instead of 711, as we now know it, but the other figure is not of very great importance.
Now, my Lord, may I say just a word, and it will not be more, because I have already indicated to you at an earlier stage of the case what my view was in answer to a question from your Lordship with reference to the discipline upon which your Lordship is asked a specific question; I think it is No. 17. My Lord, one cannot peruse the evidence given in this case without, I think, being very much struck by the discipline of the crew, taken as a whole, and of the behaviour of the crew. To take one instance, and I think a very, very striking one, to which I was adverting only a little while ago, when I called your attention to the evidence of Dillon and Cavell, trimmer and fireman, who were in No. 4 boiler room, they had been on deck, and there were others who had been ordered down below in a vessel which they know was in great jeopardy, and who heard the order which had been given from the bridge to uncover the boats and to man them, and to be ready to launch them, and to fill them with women and children. All these men on board knew perfectly well that they were in grave peril, and yet it is one striking fact that they go down, apparently without any question, without any murmur, they go down below to work on board that vessel, and down below in the hold when the water was coming in, as we know, in No. 4 boiler room, till the water was up to their knees, when they were ordered to come up on deck through the escape, and when they found, in fact, that all the boats had gone except the collapsible, and I think one ought to bear in mind the behaviour of these men in the circumstances. These were not even seamen, and on the whole I do not think that one is saying a word too much when we say that the behaviour of those men was heroic. My Lord, one is also struck in reference to the evidence about the engineers. Not a single engineer was saved. As my learned friend Mr. Roche said in the very admirable address he made to your Lordship, it is by no means an uncommon thing; it is a common thing to find that no engineers were saved. There they are right down in the vessel, and during a time of peril they do not come up, and they did not come up in this case until, if at all, all hope of safety had disappeared. There is some evidence of some eight men having been seen, it is not quite clear that it is right that they were engineers, but whether they were or not, when they were seen it is as plain as possible that it was only after all the boats had gone, and when there was no hope of rescuing them. And another striking fact which is worth remembering also, of which my learned friend reminds me very pertinently, I think, is that there were eight ship's boys on board this vessel. We have heard nothing about them; they played no part in their humble capacity on board this vessel as ship's boys; every one of them was drowned. They might very properly, if it had been desired, been treated as juveniles, but they were not; they went down as part of the crew of the ship; and, as I say, we do not hear a single word about them.
My Lord, really, speaking with the rarest exceptions in this case, everybody on board seems to have behaved in this moment of the gravest peril, realising, as they must have done, that they were in imminent danger of losing their lives, with a calmness and with a devotion to duty which I hope will always be remembered to the credit of those who sail on board British vessels. My Lord, in the same connection, I think one ought also to remember the passengers; the accounts which have been given of the women who refused to leave their husbands; took their chance, and must have known perfectly well what it meant; and the accounts that we have had of some, knowing quite well that, by staying on board, they were doomed to destruction, nevertheless preferred it - preferred to remain with their husbands to going on board the boats. It must also not be forgotten, my Lord, that the men, with the exception of, I think, only in one instance of which evidence was given of a rush by the second and third class passengers to one boat, which was checked, as your Lordship will remember, by Mr. Lowe - with that exception, again the passengers seem to have behaved extremely well. My Lord, the men on board made no attempt to leave the vessel. It must have been realised, I suppose, at an early moment on board that vessel, so far as one is able to reconstruct the scene, that there was only accommodation, and that not even sufficient, for the women and children on board that vessel, and no attempt made on behalf of the men to force themselves in, as your Lordship so pertinently observed recently; even in one case where there were two men who got in because they thought there were no more women, when the women were seen the men got out and the women were placed in the boat and were saved. Your Lordship will remember again one other significant fact, that although the stewards and crew were marshaled to keep the line and to prevent the male passengers from getting into the boats, and to take care that only women and children got into the boats, the evidence is that they had nothing to do; that the passengers stood there and made no attempt in any way to get into the boats, but assisted in keeping order with the stewards and with the rest of the crew. All those are factors which it is as well that one should bear in mind, and I know your Lordship will bear them in mind when you come to deal with what happened on this vessel after the casualty.
My Lord, this becomes of greater significance when you present to yourself the picture in that vessel, of the ship sinking by the head, the water always getting further and further mastery over the ship, the boats going away one by one, and the realisation of those who remained on board that ship that, although the water was gaining control over the vessel, there was no boat, and there was no possibility of their leaving the vessel. There is some evidence, the evidence of Mr. Bride, that when the news came through, as he received it, that the "Carpathia" was coming to their assistance (I think I am right in saying that it was at 12.35 that that happened - it is within a minute or two), that that news was taken by him at any rate to some of those who were on board the vessel. It may be that that caused a good many to prefer to remain on board the vessel, but one does not know exactly how much was known of that; one can only surmise that if there was information of that kind given by him, as he says he did give it when he went up amongst the people on board the vessel, it would very soon spread and very soon be known, and no doubt helped to steady those people who were on board, and made them able to wait the arrival of the "Carpathia" with greater fortitude. But still, all the time this vessel is getting nearer and nearer to foundering, and all the time one sees that the boats are being lowered and the last means of escape are disappearing.
Now, my Lord, I do want to make one comment with regard to this matter, and that is in respect of this No. 1 boat. No. 1 boat was the emergency boat on the starboard side, the boat which has figured somewhat prominently in this case on account of the evidence which was given in the first instance by Hendrickson, and which led, in consequence of some possibly underlying suggestion to the calling of Sir Cosmo and Lady Duff-Gordon. As I said at an earlier part of this case, and I repeat it now, any comment that I have to make with regard to this boat is not directed against either Sir Cosmo or Lady Duff-Gordon. For my own part, I should find it impossible to make any harsh or severe comment upon the conduct of any woman who, in circumstances such as these, found herself suddenly lowered down this great vessel on a dark night into the water in a small boat, and who was afraid to go back because she thought there was a danger of being swamped. At any rate, I shall make
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no comment whatever upon it. But, my Lord, the evidence, and the reason why I am directing attention to it, is that it is quite plain that for some reason that boat was lowered with 12 persons in it instead of 40, and there is not the faintest explanation, as far as I can see, of why that happened. There were altogether seven of the crew of that vessel; of course, a far larger proportion in comparison with passengers than in any other boat. There were seven crew and five passengers - Sir Cosmo and Lady Duff-Gordon, Miss Francatelli, and the two American passengers. That constituted the whole of the evidence. And also it is apparent from the evidence that they did not get into the boat - that is to say, these passengers - until the boat was being lowered. Your Lordship will remember the evidence in particular with regard to the two American passengers, that they came running along, and were bundled into the boat at the last minute as she was going down. The order which was given is an order with which one has become somewhat familiar in this case - I do not profess to be repeating the exact words, it is not necessary that I should read them - but substantially it was that they were to stand by the vessel and to come back when called upon. My Lord, I am quite sure - in fact, I know it has exercised your Lordship's mind a good deal, as it must those of all who have striven to comprehend that order and see what it meant. The only possible explanation, it seems to me, is that it was intended at one time, as no doubt, it was according to the evidence to fetch passengers from the gangway aft. We have had the evidence about the proposal that they should be put into boats from the gangway aft, but apparently that is all we hear of it, nothing seems to have been done, and so far as I know, of the evidence no order was given as to preparing the gangway or opening the door, and one quite understands, of course, that it might have been a very dangerous thing to do if the vessel is all the time going down further and further by the head; it may have possibly been a thing that could not have been done, but, my Lord, there, I regret to say, the matter must be left as regards this boat. I am quite unable myself to offer any explanation of it. I am puzzled over it. I have read the evidence with care, but I cannot see why this boat was lowered in these circumstances and with that very small number of passengers.
My Lord, the value of it as throwing light upon this Enquiry, is, I think, twofold. First of all, it shows, I think, the importance of boat drill; it shows further that had there been boat drill, you would have had your men presumably at the moment ready, knowing what there was to be done, and I think if there had been better organisation as to what should happen in the case of an emergency such as this, there would have been a better possibility of getting the passengers into the boats. One is a little struck by this - and I make this observation for your Lordship's consideration - that although, as I have said, there was perfect discipline in the sense that there was no panic, the organisation does not seem to have been quite satisfactory with regard to getting the passengers out from their cabins and placing them in the boats. What strikes one in reading the evidence is that nobody seems to have known precisely what his duty was, or how many persons were to be placed in the boat before the boat was lowered. Certainly that is the evidence with regard to a number of the boats. I think I am right in saying (I will deal with it in detail) that there were only four of the boats that left with their full complement of passengers and crew; but all the rest left with a less number than they could have carried, more particularly could have carried on this particular night.
Now, my Lord, one must bear in mind as against that, I think, that this vessel was on her first voyage. I suppose if those who were on board the vessel, particularly the crew, if they are in the habit of being re-engaged after they have been discharged at the end of a voyage, would become more familiar with the vessel, and would better know what should be done at the particular moment, in an emergency, they would certainly know the vessel better, but it is a factor which ought to be borne in mind that during this voyage at this particular moment when this emergency arose, there seems to have been no satisfactory organisation with regard to getting the passengers on deck. What I mean by that is, I should have thought that it might have been possible to have had men told off whose duty it would have been in an emergency of this character to call the passengers and to bring them on deck; but, in any event, what we do know about it is that these boats left, and left without their full complement, which might have carried a larger number, and therefore would have led to a smaller loss of life, and that of these the worst of them is this boat No. 1.
Now, my Lord, the comment I desire to make upon that is more especially with regard to the man who was in charge (and the man who was in charge was Symons), whose duty it was to attempt to save life if there was any possibility of doing that. The man does not seem to have carried out, at any rate, the order that was given to him. He was told to go away and stand by. Instead of that, as far as I understand his evidence, and I have looked at it with great care, he seems to have got away as far as he possibly could; and when he heard the cries, although one can quite realise and quite understand that a man would hesitate, and rightly hesitate, at plunging into a mass of struggling people, yet at the same time there were a great number who might have been saved if the boat had gone back before he had got as far as the people who were huddled together, according to the evidence of one person, as they were in the water after the vessel had gone down, and Symons' evidence, I suggest to your Lordship, was unsatisfactory. He gave no proper account of why he did it. He had got some parrot phrases somewhere in his mind that in the exercise of his discretion he had done it and that he was the master of the situation, but they afforded, as far as I can follow, no justification for what he did, and I do not think there is one, and, as far as I am able to see from the evidence, there is no explanation of why he went away and made no attempt at all to save life - no explanation at all, except that he says he was afraid that if he had gone back they would have been swamped. My submission to your Lordship with regard to that is that it is not a true explanation of what happened at that time. He was afraid also, I think I am right in saying, of suction. My Lord, none of those things justify a man in his position who is used to the sea -
The Commissioner: When was the boat lowered into the water?
The Attorney-General: I think it was from ten minutes past one till a quarter-past one.
The Commissioner: It was a full hour before the foundering of the "Titanic."
The Attorney-General: Quite. The order in which the boats were lowered, I think, was 7, 5, 3, 1, and this boat would be lowered just about ten minutes to a quarter-past one, according to the evidence. As your Lordship says, that was at least an hour before the foundering. But as to that part of the case, as to what happened, why he did not come back, what he did, and why no further passengers were placed in the boat, I confess to me is very difficult to explain. I can see no justification for it, and I can see no explanation for it, but there it stands. My Lord, when I say I see no explanation of it, I think it is right to bear this in mind, and to call your Lordship's attention to it, that Mr. Lowe, the officer, said he took everybody who was on board who was there as far as he could see, and that there were no people left on the starboard deck at the time. I think that must be a mistake, because it is quite clear that after that, the four after boats were lowered on the starboard deck, and that there were a number of passengers and crew who were in those boats. As your Lordship will remember, boat No. 15, which is the one as to which there was a good deal of discussion, was the last one which left. So that he must be mistaken with regard to that. I suppose what it really means is that he did not see any others, but it cannot be that there were no other women and children on the starboard deck at the time this boat
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was lowered, as we know for an absolute certainty that the other four boats were subsequently lowered, and of course carried with them a number of women and children.
The Commissioner: The capacity of this boat was 40?
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: And it went away with 12?
The Attorney-General: Yes, of which seven were crew.
The Commissioner: Was there any other boat that went away with so small a proportion of passengers on board?
The Attorney-General: No, my Lord, there was no other boat; and there was no other boat which went away with a larger number of crew than passengers either - none. Well, my Lord, I confess I am quite unable to understand why that boat was lowered in that way, and equally I am unable to understand why no attempt was made by Symons subsequently to save the lives of some at least of the people who were in the water.
Now, my Lord, dealing generally with the boats, I am not going through it in detail because your Lordship has the list before you, generally dealing with them, the only boats that took their full complement and even more were four, Nos. 11, 13, 14, and 15, that is the total. Now, my Lord, one has to see why it was, what explanations were given of why these boats were not more fully loaded. In this particular case, of course, it was of supreme importance, because if the boats had been loaded to their full capacity in each case, there would have been so many more lives saved which were lost. Now, my Lord, in the first instance, the one view is that officers superintending the lowering were afraid that the boats would buckle or that the falls would give way. That is one explanation. The second is that there were no more women at hand to get into the boats, or, in any event, no women who were willing to get in. The third is that it was contemplated that more people would be put into the boats when they were in the water from the gangway ladders - that is the explanation I referred to before. Those, I think, are the three explanations of why every boat did not go away at least with its full complement.
Now, my Lord, I do think that in this case it strikes one as very regrettable that the officers should have had doubts in their minds as to the buckling of these boats or as to the falls being incapable of bearing the strain of carrying the full complement down, because there is no doubt that a number of boats were lowered into the water with less than their full complement for that reason. That is quite clear.
The Commissioner: Is there any satisfactory evidence that they did fear the buckling of the boats?
The Attorney-General: There is a statement with regard to it of the witnesses, my Lord.
The Commissioner: I know. I mean, what is the statement to that effect? Are we to be led to suppose that these lifeboats are so constructed that they will bear the strain, when hanging from the davits, of the full complement of passengers?
The Attorney-General: I should have thought so, my Lord. I should have thought that clearly they were constructed for that purpose.
The Commissioner: Then I do not see, if that is so, why you think that the officers should know that, and then I do not know why, especially in this calm sea, there was any fear of the boats buckling. I can well imagine that the passengers, women and children, had inconceivable fear, but I cannot imagine why the officers should have had any fear of it.
The Attorney-General: Of course, there is the evidence your Lordship will remember of Mr. Lightoller about it, who himself says that that was his view; and there is also the evidence of one of the men, Poingdestre, who says that the boat was ordered to be lowered because Mr. Lightoller thought the falls would not stand a heavy load. That is the falls. It has just the same effect, of course, but it is not the boats.
The Commissioner: It is the same thing. Of course the officers ought to have known that the boats and the falls would stand the strain. I cannot help thinking that the real reason was that they could not induce any more people to get in at the time. Did Mr. Lowe stop people getting into the boat?
The Attorney-General: Certainly his view was that he was taking risks. I do not think that he stopped them.
The Commissioner: Is there any evidence that Mr. Lowe actually stopped people from getting into the boat when it was not full?
The Attorney-General: I do not think he says that. I do not remember his saying it.
The Commissioner: Did Mr. Lightoller say it?
The Attorney-General: Mr. Lightoller's view certainly was that it was not safe for the boat.
The Commissioner: He had no business to have such an idea.
The Attorney-General: I think it was deplorable of course for any officer to take that view with regard to the lifeboats, which are there for that very purpose, that the officers should not have known the number of persons to be carried. Each of these lifeboats would have carried 65 persons as lifeboats, and indeed some of the boats went away carrying 70, and those who were in the boats were saved.
The Commissioner: One boat, I think, was lowered with something like 70.
The Attorney-General: Yes, No. 11, some say 70, and some say 74.
Mr. Laing: Seventy may not be accurate. We do not know.
The Attorney-General: I agree; of course it is very difficult to say exactly how many there were, and I do not think anyone could say with precision how many were saved and how many were in each boat. But at least we do know this, that 70 to 75 is the effect of the evidence, and this boat, No. 11, seems to have carried the largest number. No. 15 was said to have carried 70; there was a good deal of evidence about that. I have before me just now Mr. Lowe's evidence about it. I do not think he said anybody was stopped. His view was that he was putting people in, and that he thought he was taking risk in doing it; and I did call your Lordship's attention when I was dealing with boat No. 1 to what he had said in dealing with passengers on the starboard side; but in this connection Mr. Lightoller's evidence is at page 314, and at Question 13883 he deals with this question, "Was boat No. 6 filled? - (A.) It was filled with a reasonable regard to safety. I did not count the people going in." That seems to be the extraordinary view or opinion he formed. "But you exercised your judgment about it? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) It was filled as much as you thought was safe in the circumstances? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) In your judgment, is it possible to fill these lifeboats when they are hanging as full as you might fill them when they are water-borne? - (A.) Most certainly not."
The Commissioner: Then he is wrong about that?
The Attorney-General: Absolutely wrong, according to everybody's opinion. Then your Lordship asks, "Is that due to the weak construction of the lifeboats, or to the insufficiency of the falls? - (A.) A brand-new fall, I daresay, would have lowered the boats down and carried the weight, but it would hardly be considered a seamanlike proceeding, as far as the sailor side of it goes, but I certainly should not think that the lifeboats would carry it without some structural damage being done - buckling or something like that. (Q.) And had you those considerations in mind in deciding how many people should go in the boat? - (A.) Yes," and then my learned friend, the Solicitor-General, who was examining him referred him to Poingdestre's evidence upon it, to which I called your Lordship's attention just now, but here it is and the convenient thing will be just to refer your Lordship to Poingdestre's evidence. It is at page 83 he is asked, "Do you know how it comes that there were not more than 42 put into this boat? - (A.) Yes." (That is boat No. 6, that is the boat constructed, of course, to carry 65, he says.) "Well, the reason is that the falls would not carry any more. (Q.) You mean somebody was frightened of the falls? - (A.)Yes, the Second Officer, Mr.
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Lightoller. "Did you say anything aloud about it" -
The Commissioner: This evidence comes to no more than this, that Lightoller was afraid.
The Attorney-General: That is all, my Lord.
The Commissioner: My attention was drawn to Mr. Lowe's evidence.
The Attorney-General: Yes, my Lord. There is a little more at page 477.
The Commissioner: That has been read already.
The Attorney-General: Yes, my Lord, it is a passage that I called attention to.
The Commissioner: "And that was why you lowered the boats from the boat deck when they were not altogether full? - (A.) I was working on the idea that the gangway doors were going to be opened, and take people from there." Then he says in answer to that last question, "Certainly; we were not going to load the boat with its floating capacity from the davits." (The Commissioner.) Do you see any reason why the lifeboats should not have been lowered full of people? - (A.) Yes, I do.
(Q.) Did you see any one of them lowered full of people - I mean with about 60 in the boat? - (A.) No, Sir; I could not say that I did. (Q.) What, in your opinion, is the reason why the boat should not be lowered full of people? - (A.) The reason, my Lord, is that the boat is suspended from both ends, and all the weight is in the middle, and that being so the boat is apt to buckle, that is, break in the middle, and both ends buckle up like that (showing), and shoot the whole lot out of her." Well, I do not know whether this man was cross-examined or examined about it again. Had he ever seen such a thing?
The Attorney-General: I am much obliged to your Lordship for calling my attention to it. Would your Lordship mind reading the next two Questions?
The Commissioner: "At all events, you would not think it safe to do it? - (A.) No.
(Q.) How many were in your boat when it was lowered? - (A.) I mustered them when I got away from the ship, and there were 58 passengers - that would be 65 altogether.
(Q.) That was lowered without buckling? - (A.) Yes, but I said I was taking on risks, Sir." "Do you think the boats were fit to be lowered with their full complement," and Lightoller and this man Lowe seems to have thought that there was some risk. What business they had to think there was some risk, I do not know.
The Attorney-General: At page 427 your Lordship will see according to that, Mr. Wilde, the Chief Officer, thought so too. Question 17897, "Can you give any explanation of this boat No. 8 being lowered and launched with only 35 passengers? - (A.) No. The only thing is that Mr. Wilde, the Chief Officer, said there were quite enough in that boat to be safe to lower it."
The Commissioner: That is another man.
The Attorney-General: Yes. "Was that in reference to the strength of the falls? - (A.) Yes.
(Q.) And the tackle for lowering? - (A.) I should say that is what he thought." Then your Lordship says "That is rather a leading question. (To the Witness.) This boat was being lowered, like the others, from the davits? - (A.) Yes, my Lord.
(Q.) And being lowered a long way? - (A.). Yes. (Q.) From the davits to the water? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Does it occur to you that Mr. Wilde might have thought that the load in her was quite enough? - (A.) Yes, I think that is about what he thought. He said there was quite enough in it to lower from the davits." Then there is a little discussion about it, and your Lordship says: "What occurred to me was that you were putting the blame on the davits and the falls, and I do not think myself, at present, that the davits and falls had anything to do with it, but it was the fear of the boat buckling and throwing the people out." Then there was some examination about that - "The falls were perfectly new. There was no difficulty experienced in lowering."
The Commissioner: I remember the suggestion made in this examination was that the falls and boats were not strong. This examination was being conducted by Mr. Scanlan. The suggestion, you know, against this ship was that the boat was not strong enough; that was the suggestion thrown out by the examination. It was not well founded, because the boats were strong.
The Attorney-General: There is no suggestion that they were not.
The Commissioner: According to this man, a boat which would hold about sixty was allowed to be lowered with about forty.
The Attorney-General: Thirty-eight, my Lord.
The Commissioner: I do not see why they should wish to construct a boat for the purpose of carrying sixty people, if it is only to be used for the purpose of carrying forty.
(After a short adjournment.)
The Attorney-General: My Lord, I have said all that I desire to say about the buckling of the boats, or the suggested weakness of the falls - that they were not of sufficient strength to carry boats with their full complements. I want to call attention now to the evidence and I shall only do so very generally, because I think it has been so very fully explained during the course of this Enquiry. The second reason to which I referred, why there were not more passengers in the boats, was that the order had been given that women and children only were to be placed in the boats, and that there was a difficulty in getting women and children to go into the boats. There are a great many passages in the evidence, but I do not expect that your Lordship would desire me to go through that, as that is a matter upon which there can be no controversy.
The Commissioner: I think not.
The Attorney-General: If your Lordship pleases. The same observations would apply to the evidence which has been given about the gangway. That is the third suggested reason why there were not more passengers placed in the boats, because it was contemplated that this gangway would be opened and that they would be able to recall the boats to put more passengers in them. It simply remains as a suggestion; nothing was done, as your Lordship knows, with regard to it; and I gather from the evidence also that if it had been necessary to do it, it would have taken a considerable amount of time to open this gangway door and presumably to fit the gangway so as to lower the gangway and let the passengers down by it into the boats.
The next thing that I desire to direct attention to, and that very shortly, is why it was that there were not more passengers picked up by the boats after the vessel had foundered? There are four reasons given for that through the evidence. The first was that the persons in the boats were afraid of being swamped by others attempting to board them; that I have already commented upon. The second was that there was a danger of suction; the third that the boats were told to pull for a light and were too far away to return (that only applies to some of the boats); and the fourth was that the boats were not well enough manned to make their way back to the ship with any hope of being useful. That was thrown out as an explanation of why some of the boats did not go back. It occurs to me that the last one is a very unsatisfactory explanation, because there does not seem to be any reason why they should not have been able to get back, assuming that they had remained only within a short distance of the "Titanic." The evidence upon that is somewhat voluminous, but I cannot think again that any useful purpose is served by travelling in detail through that, as these four reasons are sufficiently well established by the evidence. It seems to me, to make it unnecessary for me to
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travel through it in detail, and to call your Lordship's attention to particular questions and answers.
Then, my Lord, I return to the general question which I was considering in dealing with the boats; that is, as to what steps were taken to save life. In the first place, I have called your Lordship's attention to what was done with regard to the boats. Then there were the attempts to summon the passengers to the boat deck with lifebelts and warm clothing. Your Lordship will remember there was a good deal of evidence given in detail with regard to that. The evidence with regard to the third class passengers is, in the main, the evidence of Hart, at pages 221 to 225, and at page 230; and the evidence of Pearcey at page 231, Mackay, 237, and 239, and Wheat, at page 241. Your attention has been called in some detail to this, and I think you have all the references that are material upon it. If your Lordship should require them again I can supply them, but I do not want to do it unnecessarily, as I am very anxious to get to a conclusion. I think your Lordship really has them sufficiently. That deals with the orders that were given with regard to the boats, and with the summoning of the passengers to the deck.
Then there is a third step which was taken, which was to send up distress signals and to use the Morse flashlight. The evidence as to that is in Rowe's evidence on page 419, Questions 17657 to 17684. He says that rockets were sent up. It comes at the end of Question 17657. It gives in detail what happened. The particular question with regard to the evidence of the time they were sent up, is at the end, Question 17684. On the same page, 419, there is the evidence about the Morse signaling, Question 17660; and then at 17684 is the sending up of the rockets from about a quarter to 1; he says he noticed it till about 1.25.
Boxhall's evidence with regard to it is on pages 356 and 357, Questions 15394 to 15420. He is asked about the steamer: "(Q.) Could you see how far off she was? - (A.) No, I could not see, but I had sent in the meantime for some rockets, and told the Captain I had sent for some rockets, and told him I would send them off, and told him when I saw this light. He said, Yes, carry on with it. I was sending rockets off and watching this steamer. Between the time of sending the rockets off and watching the steamer approach us I was making myself generally useful round the port side of the deck. (Q.) How many rockets did you send up, about? - (A.) I could not say, between half a dozen and a dozen, I should say, as near as I could tell. (Q.) What sort of rockets were they? - (A.) The rocket distress signal." Then he describes their effect: "(A.) You see a luminous tail behind them and then they explode in the air and burst into stars. (Q.) Did you send them up at intervals one at a time? - (A.) One at a time, yes. (Q.) At about what kind of intervals? - (A.) Well, probably five minutes; I did not take any times. (Q.) Did you watch the lights of this steamer while you were sending the rockets up? - (A.) Yes."
I may have to recur to that in connection with the "Californian" incident later. At present all I wanted to do was to call your Lordship's attention to what steps were taken.
Then besides that, there are the wireless messages which were sent which appear in the Marconi procès-verbal, of which your Lordship already has the information - I mean the C. Q. D. and the S. O. S. messages, which were sent all round. No doubt everything was done that was possible by wireless telegraphy in order to attract the attention of vessels. I think the first signal sent, from the procès-verbal, was 12.15 a.m. to the "La Provence." If your Lordship has the Marconi records it is only necessary to call attention to the time at which the first message was sent, which was 12.15 a.m.; "'La Provence' receives 'Titanic' distress signals." Then also at 12.15 a.m.: "'Mount Temple: 'Titanic' sending C.Q.D., says require assistance, gives position"; and at 12.25 the "Carpathia" receives the message. That is on the same page. The first is "La Provence" receives "Titanic" distress signals at 12.15, then the "Mount Temple" hears the "Titanic" at 12.15 sending the C.Q.D., and then I went on to 12.25, when the "Carpathia" received the signal. I think to that your Lordship must add the evidence of Mr. Cottam, which is at page 405, which shows that the message sent immediately by the Captain of the "Carpathia," Captain Rostron, was that he was turning round and coming to the assistance of the "Titanic." It does not appear in the procès-verbal, because Mr. Cottam explained he did not write it down. You find that at page 405, Question 17107 - I might begin at 17105 - he says he confirmed the message before reporting it to the bridge: "I asked him if he intended me to go straight away to the bridge and get the ship turned round immediately, and he said, 'Yes, quick.' (Q.) Did you go to the bridge? - (A.) Straight away, yes. (Q.) You reported it to your Captain? - (A.) To the officer on watch first, and, from him, to the Captain. (Q.) Then what was done about the 'Carpathia'? - (A.) She was turned round immediately. (Q.) And made for the position? - (A.) And headed for the position, yes. (Q.) Then you, I suppose, would go back to the Marconi room to your instrument? - (A.) Yes I did; I went right away. (Q.) Up to this time had you sent the 'Titanic' any news of where you were? - (A.) No, not up to then. I went straight away back to the cabin and sent our position. (Q.) Who gave you your position? - (A.) The Captain gave me our position. (Q.) Then you were in a position to tell the 'Titanic' where you were? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) And did you tell her that you were coming to her assistance? - (A.) I did."
The Commissioner: What time was that?
The Attorney-General: That is 12.35 'Titanic' time. We have had it at some time that that was the time it took place. Bride gave us the time and I will give you the reference.
The Commissioner: Bride tells us when he received it?
The Attorney-General: Yes, it is at page 388, Question 16517: "What was the message from the 'Carpathia,' so far as you can recollect it? - (A.) She transmitted her position and told us she had turned round and was coming along as fast as she could. (Q.) To your assistance? - (A.) Yes." Then at Question 16523 he says he reported that to the Captain and Mr. Phillips remained in the room.
The Commissioner: That does not give the time.
The Attorney-General: No, my Lord, he has said the time, but for the moment I have not the reference. At Question 16511 you will see: "You have told us you came up at 12 o'clock and that then you heard this conversation." The only importance of that was that, of course, it must be at some period after that that he is on deck, because he comes back there at 12 o'clock. This is very near it on page 393, at the end of his evidence, Question 16795, "Do you remember how long it was after the collision when you learned that the "Carpathia" was coming to your assistance? - (A.) The "Carpathia" was the second boat to answer our call. (Q.) Can you remember how long that was after the collision? - (A.) No, I could not tell you; it was within a very short space of time after we sent out our first distress signal. (Q.) And you took that message to the Captain, you told us? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Now, do you know if the Captain communicated the substance of your message to any of the officers or to the crew? - (A.) I passed the word myself as I went to find the Captain. (Q.) To whom did you pass it? - (A.) To anybody whom I happened to go close by. (Q.) Did you pass it to any of the officers? - (A.) Not to my knowledge. (Q.) But you gave it out that the "Carpathia" was coming to your assistance? - (A.) Yes.
The Commissioner: Where do you get the 12.35 from?
The Attorney-General: 12.25 is the time given of the message being received by the "Carpathia" from the "Titanic."
The Commissioner: I thought 12.35 was the time when the "Titanic" received the message; I thought you said so. It would be the same time, I
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suppose. I mean to say, when the "Carpathia" sends a message to the "Titanic," the "Titanic" receives it at the same moment.
The Attorney-General: Yes, 12.25, you have got quite definitely that call was received from the "Titanic" by the "Carpathia." Then you know what happened is that Cottam goes to the bridge.
The Commissioner: He went to the bridge and spoke to the Captain, and the Captain said: "Let them know our position, and tell them we are coming."
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: That could not have taken more than a few minutes.
The Attorney-General: I do not reckon it more than a few minutes. I put it at the very latest at 12.35. That is how I get to the time.
The Commissioner: Evidently Bride cannot tell us exactly, but it must have been very shortly after.
The Attorney-General: It is within a few minutes, certainly. I do not want to take too close a time; I put it at 10 minutes, so as to make it quite safe.
The Commissioner: At about 20 minutes to 1 they would receive the "Carpathia's" message.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: It is a good hour after the accident.
The Attorney-General: Apparently the first signal by wireless telegraphy, so far as I have been able to get from the evidence, is 12.15. From 11.40 to 12.15 nothing was done by Marconigram, so far as this shows us. But at that time the message is sent out, and your Lordship sees, was received by several vessels at 12.15, by the "Carpathia" at 12.25, and then within a few minutes she sends her message that she is coming to their assistance. Of course, they go on for a considerable time, but I do not think it helps very much. What your Lordship wanted to know was when the "Carpathia" signalled.
Now, my Lord, that deals with all the steps that were taken after the vessel had come into collision. It is not very easy to see why they did not send a message earlier by Marconigram, because they knew apparently within a very few minutes, within 10 minutes, that the vessel was seriously injured. They may have waited.
The Commissioner: That is what occurred to me. The Captain must have known it was necessary to get assistance as speedily as possible, within a quarter of an hour, and one would have thought he would have gone straight to the Marconi room and summoned assistance. But you say 12.15 is the first.
The Attorney-General: Yes, that is the first. That is "Titanic" time.
Well, now, that, I think, disposes of all the evidence that there is, as to steps taken after the collision. What happened subsequently has given rise to some doubt at one time, but I think it is abundantly clear now, particularly after the evidence of the officers, that, although it may have been thought at one moment, and certainly was by some of the crew - some of the earlier witnesses who were called before you - that the vessel had broken in two at one stage, and that the head, the fore part of the vessel, had disappeared, leaving the afterpart floating for a time, which then disappeared, that is disposed of now.
The Commissioner: There is no suggestion of that now.
The Attorney-General: No. I think the reason why they came to that conclusion was that apparently one of the funnels broke aft, and possibly those looking at it, seeing that happen, may have thought that meant that the afterpart of the vessel was still afloat. That is some explanation of it. But it is quite plain, I think, from the evidence which has been given now that she did not break in two, there can be no question of that, and that she did go down certainly with her stern at an angle of something like 45 degrees. I think that seems to be established pretty clearly by the evidence, especially by the evidence of the officers, and that would be explained also by the plan which Mr. Wilding put in, which showed your Lordship what would happen if those compartments became filled. It is exactly what those who are skilled in the flotability of vessels would naturally expect to happen, and what, according to the evidence, did happen.
That brings me to the two last points, undoubtedly important ones, upon which I have to address you, and one is the very important matter of the boat accommodation provided by the "Titanic," and also as to whether that boat accommodation was sufficient. Well, it is quite plain, and there is nothing to be said to the contrary, that according to the evidence we have got the boat accommodation was not sufficient for the number of passengers who were on board; I mean by that that on this particular occasion, had there been more boats and had the passengers been willing to leave in the boats, a greater number of lives would undoubtedly have been saved. That is quite clear.
In the observations which I want to make to your Lordship now with respect to this matter, I have to deal with the suggestions which are made as to the want of proper provision by the Board of Trade for an emergency of this character, and I think it substantially amounts, when one has considered all the evidence that has been given, to the suggestion that the Board of Trade ought to have provided a scale of boat accommodation for vessels of over 10,000 tons and in different gradations, so that it would have been necessary according to the Board of Trade requirements.
The Commissioner: Over 10,000?
The Attorney-General: Yes, I say over 10,000, because it stopped there; over 10,000 and upwards was where it stopped, as your Lordship remembers; and a good deal of criticism has been directed to the fact that the Board of Trade did not make a scale dealing with the different gradations of tonnage over that 10,000 tonnage. I want to call your Lordship's attention to how that matter stands, but before I do so I just want to refer, which I shall do very shortly because of what your Lordship has already said, to the evidence about the bulkheads. It is very difficult to separate entirely the consideration of these two matters, because the policy of the Advisory Committee and the policy also of the Bulkhead Committee, which sat in 1890 and reported upon this matter, was that it was better to make ample provision for the unsinkability of the ship, so far as it was possible, than to provide complete accommodation for all persons on board the vessel.
With reference to that what I should submit to the Court is, that both the Board of Trade and the Committee who were dealing with this matter were right to this extent, that it is more important to have efficient provision of watertight compartments and proper subdivision, sufficiently strong bulkheads, so arranged that if there is a collision and penetration of the ship's side the vessel should still float, than it is to have complete accommodation for the full number of passengers. I do not mean for a moment by that to suggest that it is not necessary to have boats; that is not the point of my observation at all. What I do mean is that the first thing to look to is the provide as far as you possibly can, according to the scientific knowledge of the present day, the unsinkability of the vessel.
And, my Lord, one has to bear in mind also in that connection that it is an extremely rare occurrence in the annals of the sea for a vessel to be struck as this one was in so many compartments. In the ordinary course of things, if you provide that your vessel was unsinkable, assuming she had two adjoining compartments holed, and particularly if she was so loaded that she would float with a third compartment also penetrated, that would be all that human ingenuity could devise for the purpose of protecting the ship. In this particular case, as I have already indicated and submitted to the Court, and do not want to repeat, the grave injuries that were inflicted were owing to the excessive speed at which this vessel was travelling when meeting the iceberg, the consequence of which was that she received so many wounds. The view taken with regard to this has been very consistent from the time the Bulkhead Committee - what has been called Sir
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Edward Harland's Committee - was appointed in 1890, and reported, up to the present date; and it seems also to have been the view of the German authorities, because your Lordship will remember from the documents which I put before you that they have the same system in Germany, that provided a vessel is equipped with efficient watertight compartments, the demand that is made upon her for additional boat accommodation is dispensed with to a certain extent. That is what they say - you need only provide half the full boat accommodation if you have efficient watertight compartments. What we do is very much the same thing, I am referring now to Rule 12, to which your Lordship has had a good deal of reference, in the Board of Trade Rules. It is on page 16 of the Rules of the Board of Trade. "When ships of any class are divided into efficient watertight compartments to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade, they shall only be required to carry additional boats, rafts, and buoyant apparatus one-half of the capacity required by these Rules, but the exemption shall not extend to lifejackets or similar approved articles of equal buoyancy suitable to be worn on the person."
I am only referring to that for this purpose. I only want to show that the policy has been the same in this country and in Germany to encourage efficient watertight compartments, and that those charged with the administration of these maritime matters in Germany as well as here have taken the view that, provided there is an efficient subdivision of proper watertight compartments, there is an exemption from the provision that the full number of additional craft of all kinds shall be carried.
The Commissioner: I do not see the reason.
The Attorney-General: One reason I should think would be that they want to encourage vessels to have efficient watertight compartments.
The Commissioner: It seems to me a most improper thing to bribe, as it were, the shipowner to build his vessel with the lives of the people who are on board.
The Attorney-General: That is not what they intend to do. Both in Germany and here, what they thought they were doing by it -
The Commissioner: As long as there is a reasonable possibility of the ship foundering why should there be less boat accommodation than the number of lives requires?
The Attorney-General: The view, no doubt, is, that if you have provided efficient watertight compartments, you have made a very good provision against the foundering of the vessel; and that they can keep the vessel afloat so much longer, and that if you have a certain number of boats you may be able then, with this number, to get assistance or to take your passengers off to another vessel or to the shore, as the case may be, inasmuch as you can keep your vessel afloat so much longer if you have watertight compartments.
The Commissioner: This Rule was made long before the days of Marconi apparatus.
The Attorney-General: Oh, yes, it was made about 10 years before they had that. I think the evidence is the first vessel was in 1900 in which they had wireless telegraphy. The Report of Sir Edward Harland's Committee was in 1890.
The Commissioner: Was it, or was it in 1894?
The Attorney-General: No, in 1894 there was another alteration.
The Commissioner: There was one alteration, from 9,000 to 10,000.
The Attorney-General: Yes; that is on a different matter. That is dealing with the scale of boats. But whatever the reason was, and I quite appreciate the criticism which may be directed in view of what we now know; it certainly would not entitle, and I would not suggest that it entitled, a shipowner to dispense with a sufficient number of boats. But the view taken, the policy pursued right through from 1894, not only here but abroad, was that if you had these watertight compartments you may dispense with some part of the additional boat accommodation.
The Commissioner: There has been very little.
The Attorney-General: Not much. I think we had the evidence. It is some 60 odd during the number of years, at most, three or four a year.
The Commissioner: Are you upon the question of the Board of Trade now with reference to the boat accommodation?
The Attorney-General: Yes, I shall have to deal with that now.
The Commissioner: Are you upon it now?
The Attorney-General: Yes, I indicated just now I am going to deal with the boat accommodation, and of course in considering it I have to consider the suggestion which was made and the criticism upon the conduct of the Board of Trade. I must consider that in dealing with the whole of this matter. It applies, and I think you must bear it in mind, both in dealing with the bulkheads and with the boats. What I wanted to say about the boats, before I get to what actually happened with the Board of Trade, is that one must bear in mind in this connection that so far as the records of loss of life at sea go there is no case on record where the boats provided have not been sufficient for the purposes of saving life. There is no case on record, according to the evidence - your Lordship will remember Captain Young was asked the question, and I think by your Lordship - in which it has been shown that life has been lost in consequence of an insufficiency of boats. You also have to bear in mind in this connection that for a great number of years the loss of life was very small compared to the number of passengers carried. The reason why I refer to that is, as your Lordship will appreciate, that the Committee that was sitting considering these matters and the Board of Trade afterwards, in dealing with the advice of the Committee, would have naturally to have regard to what had happened as guiding them as to what was likely to happen in the future.
Now, there are a number of criticisms which have been directed, and properly directed, I think, to the providing of increased boat accommodation. I do not profess to say, and I gather from what your Lordship said at an earlier stage, you did not intend to say what number of boats should be provided in a vessel of this character, but I think one is entitled to say this; that as the result of what has happened with regard to the "Titanic," it is clear there should be a larger number of boats provided. That is, I think, how it stands at present, that it is not sufficient merely to stipulate that there should be a boatage accommodation of 9,625 feet cubic capacity, as it was prior to this for vessels of 10,000 tons and upwards, but there ought to be increased accommodation; and when I say that, your Lordship will bear in mind that the matter has been enquired into quite recently by the Committee in 1911, and that they formulated their views as to a new scale with regard to boats.
Before I deal with the boats I want to clear out of the way, if I may, the question relating to bulkheads. I am bound to refer to it, because of course it forms an important element, or has been thought to form an important element, in considering how many boats should be provided for a vessel. But in this Enquiry, and in your Lordship's Report, as we know, we have not to deal with the requirements, we have not to consider whether or not the Bulkheads Committee which reported in 1890, or which was appointed in 1890, when sufficiently far; whether there should be a watertight deck, a matter which has formed the subject of considerable discussion; or whether you should have longitudinal divisions such as exist in the "Mauretania" and the "Lusitania." I think what one may say with reference to it, and what one is justified in saying upon the evidence, is that the "Titanic," according to all the knowledge available at the time of her construction, was a well equipped vessel, and was efficiently provided with watertight compartments. Whether the system which they adopted was as good as or better than the system adopted in the "Mauretania" and "Lusitania" is no doubt a matter which will form the subject for
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investigation by the Committee which has been appointed to consider these matters.
But there are obviously considerations which must apply, considerations of advantages and disadvantages of both systems. In fact, I am quite sure from what your Lordship has said, that you are not in a position to pronounce, and that you do not intend to pronounce, upon that question in this Enquiry. It is obviously as the result of the questions which have been put during the course of this investigation, a very difficult matter and one which will involve a great deal of expert knowledge and investigation. The only reason that I am referring to it at present is that I do not feel that it would be right to suggest, and I certainly do not suggest, that the "Titanic" when she left on this first voyage was not properly equipped or not properly constructed or not properly designed. The view which I present to your Lordship as the result of all the evidence is that she was according to all experience and knowledge as good a ship as had ever left port, and that every care had been taken to make her, as they thought, unsinkable. But as we know from the result of what happened, they turned out to be quite wrong.
The Commissioner: "Unsinkable" is a comparative term in that connection.
The Attorney-General: As your Lordship pleases. I was going to say "unsinkable" means having regard to what you would ordinarily expect to happen to a vessel. The term has undoubtedly been used with regard to vessels, and was used with regard to the "Titanic" and the "Olympic" because it was thought that a vessel which would float with two adjoining compartments flooded was an unsinkable vessel. I propose therefore to say nothing further with regard to bulkheads than that, merely having called attention to the design of this vessel, as I am bound to do, because of the questions which are before your Lordship.
A good deal of criticism was directed also at one time, with which I am not going to deal, as to the requirements of the Board of Trade, or some officials of the Board of Trade not having been complied with - I mean with reference to Table C. I think my friend, Mr. Laing, showed quite clearly from the correspondence that that was erroneous.
The Commissioner: I think the correspondence quite disposed of that.
The Attorney-General: Yes, my Lord; it has quite disposed of it, and I do not propose to say anything more about it. When one read the correspondence it disposed entirely of that question.
When we come to consider what boat accommodation should have been provided, there are a number of considerations which certainly have affected those who have advised the Board of Trade hitherto, apart from what has happened to the "Titanic." It was said and thought apparently that if you carried more boats on a vessel such as the "Titanic," or a large increase in the number of boats, you would make her too tender. It was thought that you would hamper her decks, and it would be difficult to use the boats. Another consideration which was put, was that it would be difficult to launch them, that you would not be able to launch a large number of the boats if you had them on the deck. Then one must also bear in mind that it is an extremely rare occurrence that you would be able to launch all the boats on both sides of the vessel, as happened in this case. But, nevertheless, the view that I suggest to the Court as the result of all this evidence is, that more boats could be carried. What number I do not propose to say, because naturally that must depend upon many considerations. I think the best answer that can be given to the arguments that were urged about the tenderness of the vessel is that in fact a larger number of boats is carried on board of some of the larger German vessels.
I want now to direct your Lordship's attention to what has happened with regard to the Board of Trade.
The Commissioner: Have you another copy of the Memorandum?
The Attorney-General: Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner: It contains a history of what the Board of Trade have done?
The Attorney-General: Yes, my Lord; your Lordship shall have it in a moment.
The Commissioner: You need not trouble; I have it now.
The Attorney-General: What appears first from this is that under the Statute of 1888, which I am only referring to for the purpose of history, so that one may appreciate what happened hereafter, a committee was to be appointed which was to advise the Board of Trade as to life-saving appliances. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to it because by the 17th Schedule of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, the constitution of the Committee which is to be formed, is provided. What really happened was that the Act of 1888 was repealed, and the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 provided the constitution of the Committee which was to act. Then just before I get to the Statute of 1894, which for the moment I have only called your Lordship's attention to for the purpose of showing of whom the Committee was to consist, you will find that in 1890 the Committee which was advising the Board of Trade on life-saving appliances (that was the Committee which had been appointed under the Act of 1888) reported in favour of a scale extending to 9,000 tons and upwards. It stopped at that. Then if your Lordship will look at page 3 of the Memorandum you will see it summarises the history very well.
At the bottom of the page, the last three paragraphs it says: "It will be convenient to summarise the effect of these Rules of 1889, 1890 and 1894 on the minimum provision of boat accommodation required from large passenger steamers carrying emigrants. The life-saving appliances Rules, which came into operation on the 31st March, 1890, provided for ships up to a maximum tonnage of 9,000 tons and over. If efficiently divided into watertight compartments so that with two compartments flooded the vessel would not sink, ships of 9,000 tons and over were relieved from the provision of one-half of the additional boat accommodation required from ships not so divided. The total boat accommodation which they were required to provide was 14 boats under davits of 5,250 cubic feet and additional accommodation making in all a boat capacity of 7,875 cubic feet."
That of course is dealing, as your Lordship sees, with watertight compartments. Then "the total boat accommodation which vessels of 9,000 tons and upwards were to provide, if not efficiently divided into watertight compartments, was a total boat capacity of 10,500 cubic feet."
That is the difference between having to carry a full additional number of boats and only half the additional number of boats.
I will go now to the Rules which came in in June, 1894, because I do not think it is important to trouble you with the slight alteration in November, 1890. In the Rules which came into effect on the 1st of June, 1894, the Table was extended to provide for vessels of 10,000 tons and upwards. Now, will your Lordship look at the Table which follows a little lower? You really get the whole effect in that Table and for the three material periods. I am only going to deal with the first and third because I do not think the one of November, 1890, is of any value. For vessels of 10,000 tons and upwards, under the Rules which came into operation in March, 1890, it was 10,500 cubic feet, if not divided into watertight compartments; if they were divided into watertight compartments it would be 7,875 cubic feet. In June, 1894, there is this alteration, that if they are not divided into watertight compartments, it is 9,625 cubic feet capacity which was to be provided, and if they were divided into watertight compartments, 7,562 cubic feet.
Now the importance in this case is that from June, 1894, until the present date, at any rate until the date of the "Titanic" disaster, that remained the scale in force. Of course, it is said that as ships increased in size so it ought to have become necessary to have more boat accommodation.
Now I want your Lordship just to consider in that connection what the position was when
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the Rules were made which came into force in June, 1894. Apparently then there were already vessels in existence of just on 13,000 tons. The "Lucania" is given as an instance. And the view taken then was that the provision for 10,000 tons and upwards was sufficient, and nothing further was done. That continued for a very considerable time. These Rules were really re-enacted in 1902, and again the scale remained for 10,000 tons and upwards, and there is no further gradation. In 1909, 1910 and 1911 there were further alterations made in the Rules, but they did not effect this scale, I mean the Committee was sitting. There was specially, your Lordship may remember, a provision made with regard to motor lifeboats, but nothing was done which affected this scale until you get to the period of February, 1911. That, I think is the important period. In February, 1911, the question was undoubtedly raised, that it was desirable that there should be a further scale and better boat accommodation on the big vessels. Of course, meanwhile, there had been much larger vessels built.
Now, my Lord, just to get the dates correctly. On the 4th April, 1911, there was the reference to the Committee to deal with this matter. It is worth bearing in mind so as to follow what happened, that by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1906, the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee was constituted under the Statute of 1906, and that since that, what has been done is that references in connection with life-saving appliances have been made to the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee, which apparently appointed a sub-committee to deal with life-saving appliances. It is just necessary to bear in mind the change which had been made from the earlier days when they had a special committee constituted under the Act for life-saving appliances.
On the 4th April, 1911, this reference was made, and your Lordship will remember what had happened before that, which I must state quite shortly; I will refer to the reports a little more in detail directly. By the 4th April there had been a considerable amount of discussion at the Board of Trade with reference to the number of boats to be provided. That led to some reports. Your Lordship will remember reports were asked for, and produced, and are contained in this bundle. There are the reports showing what each of the Surveyors who were asked to report thought was necessary, and the effect (I am only stating it for the moment quite broadly) was that they differed as to the number of boats that would be required and as to the carrying capacity, but they agreed that it would be necessary and desirable from their point of view to have a scale above the 10,000 tons and upwards; and that is the position. They thought there ought to be a scale above, but undoubtedly they differed very materially as to what the cubic capacity was that was to be provided for, as to the number of boats, and on various points.
Those reports were then sent in and the Board of Trade in consequence of that and seeing the difference of opinion there was between their advisers, referred it to the Committee by the letter of the 4th April, 1911. I will call your Lordship's attention a little more in detail to it in a minute; I just wanted to go through the dates so as to bring quite clearly before your Lordship how the matter stands.
That was reported upon on the 4th July, 1911, by the Committee, and the Committee did make a report which provided for an increased scale, but a scale very far short of sufficiency to provide for all the persons who were carried on a vessel like the "Titanic." Their report in substance came to this, that there should be a cubic capacity of boatage accommodation of 8,300 feet and that there should be a total exemption given from the necessity for providing additional craft if there was an efficient system of watertight bulkheads. This was the matter upon which your Lordship will remember Mr. Carlisle was examined, and explained what he meant by saying "it is quite true they provided for additional boat accommodation, but took it away again by the next paragraph." What he meant by that was that they provided the exemption.
Now, if your Lordship will look at the reference of the 4th of April before you get to the Committee stage, on page 22 of the report, your Lordship will see what they said to the Advisory Committee: "I am directed by the Board of Trade to enclose herewith, for the information of the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee, a copy of a question asked in the House of Commons on the 15th of February and of the answer given by the President of the Board of Trade with reference to the Life-Saving Appliances Rules made under Section 427 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. The Board are of opinion that the Table in the Appendix to the Rules should be extended upwards in the form indicated in the accompanying scale, so as to provide for vessels of tonnage up to 50,000 tons gross and upwards. It appears to the Board that the number of boats and the boat capacity need not necessarily increase in a regular proportion according to the increase in tonnage, and that due regard should be paid to what is reasonable and practicable in passenger steamers exceeding 10,000 tons. The attention of the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee is invited to the Rule of the 19th April, 1910, as to the stowage of boats" - I do not think I need read that. Then "I am to state that the Board would be obliged if the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee would be so good as to suggest in what manner the scale (see accompanying copy) should be continued upwards, having due regard to the considerations indicated above. I am further to state that the Board would be glad to learn whether the Advisory Committee are of opinion that Rule 12 should or should not be revised so as to exempt altogether from the requirement of additional boats and/or rafts those vessels which are divided into efficient watertight compartments to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade. I am to add that in considering the questions dealt with in this letter, the constitution of the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee should be identical with that of the Committee as recently constituted for the purpose of considering an amendment of the Life-saving Appliance Rules in connection with the Englehardt collapsible lifeboat."
That led to the Report which I will call attention to at once at page 24.
The Commissioner: What is the date of this?
The Attorney-General: 4th of July, 1911.
The Commissioner: I do not see any date on it.
The Attorney-General: I do not see it, but I think I am right.
The Commissioner: I see the date is on the covering letter.
The Attorney-General: Yes, that is the 4th July. "In accordance with the decision of the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee, at their meeting on Friday, the 28th April, we have given careful consideration to the letter of the 4th April from the Board of Trade, in which the Committee were asked to advise: (1) As to the manner in which the Table in the Appendix to the Life-Saving Appliances Rules should be extended so as to provide for vessels of tonnage up to 50,000 tons gross and upwards; and (2) as to whether Rule 12 should or should not be revised so as to exempt altogether from the requirement of additional boats and for rafts, those vessels which are divided into efficient watertight compartments to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade. In considering these questions, we have had specially in mind the fact that the number of passengers carried does not necessarily increase in proportion to the increase in the tonnage of the vessel. This is particularly true in the case of vessels exceeding 10,000 tons, a type of vessel which is practically only built to provide special accommodation for large numbers of first and second class passengers. Similarly there is no fixed relation between the tonnage of vessels and the deck space available for the carrying of lifeboats under davits. Increase in the length of a vessel is only one of the factors, and often not the most material factor contributing to the increase in its tonnage,
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and it should also be remembered, in estimating the space available for the launching of lifeboats, that it is impossible to place davits forward of the bridge, and very undesirable to have them on the quarters of the vessel. We are strongly of opinion that every encouragement should be given to secure the provision of vessels which by their construction have been rendered as unsinkable as possible, and which are provided with efficient means for communicating with the shore or with other vessels in case of disaster. In view of these considerations we have agreed upon the following recommendations. (1) That it is questionable whether it is practicable to increase the number of davits; (2) That any increase in the number of lifeboats to be carried can probably be best effected by providing for the launching of further boats from the existing davits; (3) That the table should be extended in the manner indicated below." Then you will find for 45,000 tons and upwards, 16 boats minimum to be placed under davits; eight additional boats as a minimum to be readily available for attachment to davits, and the total minimum cubic contents of boats required by those two columns is 8,300 cubic feet.
The Commissioner: Accommodation for 830 people.
The Attorney-General: Yes. That was the view, one must bear in mind, of course, before such a disaster as the "Titanic" had happened that it was sufficient to provide accommodation for 830.
Then the Report proceeds: "It is further recommended that all passenger vessels of 10,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards should be required to be fitted with wireless telegraphy apparatus; (4) That the Rules should be amended so as to admit of decked lifeboats of an approved type being stowed on top of one another or under an open lifeboat, subject to suitable arrangements being made for launching promptly the boats so stowed; (5) That the additional boats and rafts required under the provisions of Division A, Class 1 (d) of the Life-Saving Appliances Rules shall be of at least such carrying capacity that they, and the boats required by columns 2 and 3 of the above Table, provide together three-fourths more than the minimum cubic contents required by column 4 of that Table; (6) That vessels divided into efficient watertight compartments to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade should (provided they are fitted with wireless telegraphy apparatus) be exempt from the requirements of additional boats and for rafts. The Committee suggest, in this connection, that the Board of Trade should review the requirements designed to attain the standard as to watertight compartments at present enforced by them under Rule 12, having regard to the developments of shipbuilding since the Report of the Committee on the spacing and construction of watertight bulkheads. We have also had before us the Board's further letter of the 17th May, enquiring whether, in the opinion of the Advisory Committee, it would be advisable to prescribe a maximum depth for lifeboats as compared with their breadth, and if so, what that proportion should be. In connection with this letter, we have been supplied by the Board of Trade with Reports from their Principal Officers in Great Britain, giving the dimensions and cubic capacities of the various kinds of boats on five typical ships in each of eight ports. We recommend that the Board should be advised to alter the Life-Saving Appliances Rules so as to provide that, in future, the depth of lifeboats supplied to a British merchant vessel shall not exceed 44 percent of their breadth."
Your Lordship sees the gentleman by whom this was signed. This was the Sub-committee appointed by the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee created under the statute of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1906 - this was a Sub-committee for dealing with life-saving appliances. Without going through the names of which your Lordship has heard sufficiently for the moment, and some of them will be very well known to you, it is quite plain that this was as representative a committee as you could get. There were undoubtedly representatives of shipowners, of shipbuilders, and seamen, the Union of Seamen and Firemen, of Lloyd's, and also of the Underwriters' Association. So that one has got here really as good a committee as I think could have been selected for the purpose of enquiring into what boat accommodation should be provided. But it cannot be said it is done in the interest of the shipowners - certainly not of the shipbuilders, but not of the shipowners - because you have got the seamen also represented and Lloyd's, who are vitally interested in a question of this character, and the Underwriters' Association.
If your Lordship will look at page 21, you will see Sir Theodore Doxford was the representative of the Institution of Naval Architects. Your Lordship will see on page 21 who the gentlemen are who constituted the Committee. Mr. Carlisle, at the bottom of the page, was co-opted for the occasion as representing shipbuilders, and Mr. Royden as representing shipowners; he was the gentleman who represented the Cunard Company. Sir Theodore Doxford represented the Institution of Naval Architects, and the signatory, George N. Hampson, is Captain Hampson, of the Imperial Merchant Service Guild, representing the masters and officers, Mr. Rowe represented Lloyd's Register, Mr. Ogilvie represented the Institute of London Underwriters, Mr. Havelock Wilson represented the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union, and Mr. Spencer represented the Marine Engineers' Association, that is the engineer officers.
I think it must be apparent from that, that every interest that could really give any guidance upon it was represented. This report of the Sub-Committee was adopted by the Advisory Committee.
The Commissioner: When was it adopted by the Advisory Committee; was it adopted immediately afterwards?
The Attorney-General: It is in the very letter we were referring to of the 4th July, 1911, at the bottom of page 23, the one where your Lordship got the date from: "We have the honour to report that your letter of the 4th April, with reference to the minimum number of lifeboats to be carried on vessels of 10,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards, and your letter of 17th May on the subject of the depth of lifeboats, have been very carefully considered by the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee, and that it was unanimously decided at a meeting held on the 29th ultimo to adopt the report of a Sub-Committee which was specially appointed to enquire into these questions. A copy of the report is accordingly forwarded herewith, and the Committee desire us to suggest for the consideration of the Board of Trade, that effect should be given to the recommendations contained in it."
The Commissioner: I see what happened. The Advisory Committee sent this copy of the Report of the Sub-Committee.
The Attorney-General: Yes, with a statement that they adopted it unanimously.
The Commissioner: Adopted on the 29th June.
The Attorney-General: Yes. "A copy of the report is accordingly forwarded herewith and the Committee desire us to suggest, for the consideration of the Board of Trade, that effect should be given to the recommendations contained in it."
The Commissioner: We get then to the 4th July when the Advisory Committee forward to Sir Walter Howell this report of the Sub-Committee and stated that they approved of it.
The Attorney-General: Yes. Now one fact I think we must bear in mind in connection with the Committee that the division of opinion and the differences of opinion that had taken place between the various gentlemen, who had been asked to report in answer to a circular letter which was sent out by the Board of Trade, and of which you have the details, was not stated to the Committee. There was a suggestion that it was, but it clearly was not.
The Commissioner: It was thought better not.
The Attorney-General: Yes. I submit that was the right course for them to take. The Advisory Committee were going to deal with this matter quite apart from any view which the Board of Trade officials might take, and of course the Board of Trade would then have to consider it after they
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got the report of the Advisory Committee. Then after that came back, a series of experiments were made, the view taken about this matter by the Board of Trade being that before they could prescribe a scale which was to take effect, and which could take effect as regards all ships in this country, they had to make quite sure not only of the scale which they intended to recommend, but also issue at the same time such new Rules as they intended to make with regard to the construction of boats.
The Commissioner: Of boats?
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: You mean lifeboats?
The Attorney-General: Yes. That had formed the subject of a good deal of discussion, as your Lordship has seen from the report of the Committee. It formed the subject of much discussion, and also some experiments, and it was one of the matters which led up to the sending the question of boating accommodation to the Committee in April, 1911. It is one of the matters dealt with, and one of the matters reported upon.
Captain Young deals with this at page 643. Sir Walter Howell dealt with it, but I am not going to call your Lordship's attention to his evidence, because it really does not assist very much. So far as he was concerned, what he did was to state what was done by Captain Young, and what was done by the Board of Trade, but Captain Young himself has been called, and has told you what he was doing, and, therefore, it is best to go direct to his evidence.
At page 643, Question 23290, he goes into detail as to what was done. His explanation of what happened is worth referring to before we deal with the documents upon which his statement is based, so that your Lordship may see what his explanation is. At Question 23290, Mr. Scanlan says: "When did you come to this conclusion with reference to these big boats." That is, of course, dealing with increased accommodation. - (A.) "Some months back -"
The Commissioner: With reference to these big boats like the "Titanic" you mean?
The Attorney-General: Yes. When he mentions about big boats, my friend is speaking of big vessels like the 'Titanic."
The Commissioner: I do not find here the expression "big boats" at all in the question which you are reading.
The Attorney-General: It is there, I think.
The Commissioner: "When did you come to this conclusion with reference to the boatage for the 'Titanic'? - (A.) I did not specially consider the 'Titanic' before the disaster."
The Attorney-General: Will your Lordship read your question which follows it?
The Commissioner: Yes, I beg your pardon.
The Attorney-General: "(The Commissioner.) You do not follow what Mr. Scanlan means. When did you come to this conclusion with reference to these big boats? - (A.) Some months back, my Lord; in fact, when the Report of the Advisory Committee was presented, and I went into the matter, I had this in my mind, but it was complicated by a matter which was of a very serious import, and upon that matter hangs the whole of the so-called delay, which has taken place between the 4th July and the 4th April." That is the 4th April, 1912. "The import of that was I had several matters to consider. In the course of my experience I had realised that the boats that were supplied to ships as lifeboats had been steadily deteriorating in form. I may say that is my opinion. And it appeared to me not only undesirable, but it would have been wrong, in my opinion, with those ideas, to advocate a very large extension of the boat scale; in other words, piling up a large number of boats on to a ship with the knowledge that I had in my mind at the time that those boats were not well adapted for that purpose. In other words, I was impressed with the view that in anything but the calmest weather those boats would not be able to carry in safety the number of people for which they measured; and, therefore, it was" - it is according to the report "unnecessary" but that is clearly wrong - and, therefore, it was necessary under those circumstances to associate with the Report of the Advisory Committee this question of the proper form of the ship's lifeboats. That is the object that I had in view. That is the sole cause of the delay which has been attributed to the Board of Trade in this matter."
Then your Lordship puts to him: "Do you wish us to understand that the boats of the 'Titanic' were not in a proper form? - (A.) I am not alluding to the 'Titanic,' my Lord; I am alluding to the general question of the boats. I believe, from what I have seen of the boats that have been turned out from the yard of Harland and Wolff, that those boats are of the proper form. They are of very good form. But there were many ships' boats turned out, and still are, of a form which is not the best form that can be used on board ships. I may as well say while I am on this subject that the Marine Department of the Board of Trade naturally would not take my assertion simply as an assertion, but they felt it was necessary that that assertion should be verified, and, therefore, they issued instructions for boats to be experimented with around the coast with a complement of persons for which the boats measured. I have no hesitation in saying that the results of those investigations and experiments have fully justified the action which I took on receipt of the Advisory Committee's Report."
May I pause there for a moment just to say what it is he is explaining there. His view, rightly or wrongly was this, that before they issued these Instructions or Rules for the boat scale, they ought to take care also to have quite clear in their minds what construction of boat it was that they were going to require or what special provisions they were going to make and the ratio of depth to breadth. That was the point he had in mind because his view was that in order to make up the cubic capacity to what was required the boats were made far deeper than they ought to be, with the consequence that they would not be able to carry the number of persons for whom really boats of that cubic capacity were intended by the Board of Trade. That was his point. He took the view that in those circumstances what he had to do was to get quite clear what kind of boat they were going to prescribe, and what dimensions, so that they should not first of all issue regulations which would affect the mercantile marine as to the number of boats that were to be carried, and allow them to get boats of some particular construction and of dimensions then in force, when perhaps six or nine or twelve months later they might issue further regulations, saying that all boats must have a certain ration [ratio] of depth to breadth. That is what he has in mind. Whether it is right or wrong, of course, your Lordship will consider, but that is what he means by it, and he says he thought it was important that the Board of Trade in making the demands which it was going to make upon the mercantile marine, upon these passenger and emigrant vessels, should definitely determine for itself, not only the number of boats that were to be carried, but also the dimensions which they were going to require in respect of the boats to be supplied; so that one set of Rules could be provided dealing with the whole thing.
One has to bear in mind, I think, in this connection, I submit to your Lordship, that at this time, and up to this time, from the figures which you have already got, the loss of life on this track was excessively small. There is no record of any such disaster as this, I mean no record which necessitated a very large number of boats to start with, and again, a record of carrying boats on passenger and emigrant vessels, equipped as they were both with watertight compartments and with boats which had carried passengers in safety during the last 20 years. There was ever, as your Lordship will remember from the figures provided to your Lordship, a decreasing percentage of loss of life compared with the number of passengers carried during the whole of those 20 years. I called your Lordship's particular attention to it at the time I handed those figures in.
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Now it is a little difficult - I am only making this observation in passing to your Lordship, I am sure your Lordship will bear it in mind when you come to consider what Captain Young meant, and whether he was right or wrong in the view he took - it is a little difficult now, after the event and after the loss of the "Titanic," to appreciate the position that he was taking at that time. Of course, when you have had a disaster such as this, I quite understand that it necessitates immediately that something should be done and done as speedily as possible; but you cannot in these matters make a Rule without taking into account all the various elements which naturally must affect the mercantile marine when you are going to make it.
I do not mean by that that you are to consider the cost, and say if it is too expensive, or because it involves an extra cost, therefore, the shipowner should not be called upon to do it when he is carrying passengers and emigrants, but what I mean is it is important that a public department should not harass a great industry like the shipping industry by first making one demand upon it and then making another which may mean that boats which they have provided in accordance with the Rules, we will say, in 1912, may be useless in consequence of a new Rule in 1913. That is evidently what Captain Young means by the explanation which he has given.
Then, my Lord, he goes on to tell you of the nature of the experiments and by whom they were made. They were made in the main in London and in Liverpool, and in Glasgow.
The Commissioner: Where is this?
The Attorney-General: Your Lordship will find that at Question 23295.
The Commissioner: Yes, I have it. They were, I suppose, experiments?
The Attorney-General: Yes, with boats. I will give your Lordship the dates first: February, 1911. There were some experiments then which led to the question formulated to the Committee in April, 1911. That of course is before the reference to the Committee. He says: "'The London Principal Officer forwarded on April 19th"' - I am reading about ten lines down in that question - "'A report respecting defective boats on certain vessels after only a few months' use, and it was mentioned that there was a tendency to build boats with too great a depth in order to increase the cubic capacity. The Board thereupon wrote to the Advisory Committee on 17th May, asking whether it would be advisable to prescribe a maximum depth for boats, compared with their breadth, and if so, what that proportion should be.' I may state here this is the preliminary investigation which preceded the experiments which were inaugurated after my assertions."
Then he goes on to deal with what happened on the 19th. "On the 19th May the Advisory Committee applied, semi-officially, for particulars. . . The Advisory Committee replied to the Board on the various matters under consideration on the 4th of July.'"- that is the Report of the Committee - "'and as regards the proportions of ship's boats, recommended the alteration of the life-saving appliances Rules to provide that in future the depth of lifeboats should not exceed 44 percent of their breadth.' We had this the other day my Lord. 'This recommendation was submitted to the Principal Ship Surveyor on the 8th July.'"
Now your Lordship will see what we are dealing with in the Report. Up to now it has been the investigation before the Report. "The recommendation was submitted to the Principal Ship Surveyor on the 8th July, and on the 11th July he suggested that Principal Officers might test different types of boats with a full complement of persons and report the result of the tests with reference to height of gunwale, stability, and the use of the oars.' This second series of experiments was in consequence of the assertions which I have referred to. 'This suggestion was approved on the 15th July, requesting that practical tests should be made by officers at London, Liverpool and Glasgow on the 21st July, suggesting that practical tests should be made with a view to determining - (a) a standard type of boat, (b) a maximum depth, (c) a maximum proportion of depth to breadth, and that full details should be given, with drawings of the best and worst forms tested, and notes on the height of gunwales, use of the oars, and the question of stability. The first report was received from the London Principal Officers on August 25th, and related to two boats that had been tested." I will not trouble your Lordship with reading the result of the test. He gives the particulars in detail: (a) That is London, then (b), about 15 lines down: "A further Report from the London Principal Officer was received on September 19th and gave results of tests as follows." Those were tests which were made by Captain Clarke at Southampton. Various examinations of boats which he had made and which had continued apparently up to September 15th; and again on September 16th Mr. Penney of London made a suggestion that the divisor should be 12 instead of 10 or 8. That exhausts London. The last of the Reports is September16th.
So that what we have got is that after the report of the Advisory Committee of the 4th July, which, at any rate, made some recommendations with reference to the questions submitted to them about the construction of the boats, and the dimensions of the boats that were hereafter to be used, according to Board of Trade requirements, the London Principal Surveyor made his experiments by September 15th. From Glasgow, on November 3rd, the report was received. It is at the bottom of page 644. "On November 3rd the Glasgow Principal Officer forwarded reports of tests, as follows." He gives a series of reports which had been made in October and the beginning of November, and then in the right-hand column, about five lines down, there is the report from the Liverpool Principal Officer, dated 11th November; it was stated to have been delayed owing to the recent labour troubles. "The Principal Officer forwarded details by Mr. Jenkins, the Senior Ship Surveyor, of eight tests that he had made." Then he goes into the particulars of those tests. Then, if your Lordship will look eight lines further down. "A further report was received from the Liverpool Principal Officer, dated November 15th, with remarks by two nautical Surveyors, Messrs. Rice and Jenkins. They recommended a minimum depth of 3 feet 4 inches, or breadth by 4, and a breadth of 3.5. This was a mere matter of discussion, which we went into, and did not quite agree with." Then he goes on: "A summary of all these reports was drawn up and completed on January 4th, 1912, and the Principal Ship Surveyor was asked for his observations on the whole question."
Now may I pause there for a minute and see where we are at this date. From that time, that is from July, 1911, until this period of January 4th, 1912, the experiments had been made of which the last report comes in on November 15th, 1911. They are all considered, and the summary of them is drawn up and then presented to the Principal Ship Surveyor, who is asked for his observations upon it. "The Principal Ship Surveyor was away ill at this time, and the matter was taken up by Mr. Daniel, an officer in his department acting as his deputy, who reviewed the reports of the Surveyors and their suggestions. He replied on the 27th January."
Then there is the substance of his report, "the question of the form of boat is important. Boats are generally built 'to the eye,' with simply a midship mould. It has been found that boats of the same dimensions differ considerably in actual carrying capacity. Mr. Daniel, therefore, suggested the following method: A boat should not be regarded as capable of accommodating the number of persons for which it measures according to the Rules unless it has half an inch of sheer per foot of length, and unless the half-girth of midships is at least 90 percent of the sum of the depth and half-breadth." I need not trouble your Lordship with the details of these dimensions which they were considering there, "a draft amendment of the General Rules on these lines was prepared on 1st February" - that is the draft amendment of the Rules which were to carry out the report of the
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"Committee which had been made in July, 1911 "and it was decided to submit the matter again to the Advisory Committee. Memoranda on other subjects were at the same time being prepared, and eventually the whole of the subjects that had been under consideration were, on the decision of Sir Walter Howell (4th April) embodied in one letter, which was addressed to the Committee on 16th April." Now, my Lord, the effect of that is to show that the reason of the delay in a Rule being formulated is that they were waiting, first of all, for experiments to be made which had been delayed, certainly partly, in Liverpool, for the reason given there, owing to labour trouble, and then eventually all these matters had to be considered by the Principal Ship Surveyor, and the draft Rules are formulated on 1st February, 1912.
The Commissioner: There is this memorandum at page 28.
The Attorney-General: Yes, that is right, my Lord. Those are the draft Rules.
The Commissioner: Then, on the 4th April, what happened?
The Attorney-General: On the 4th April, after consideration of the various matters pointed out to Captain Young, the order is given that the letter shall be written, and, of course, it is an unfortunate thing that that letter was not written immediately, but your Lordship has had all the evidence before you about that, and it is not open to any doubt, that the order was given on the 4th April, although, in fact, the letter was not sent out until the 16th.
The Commissioner: I am quite satisfied with the explanation given about it.
The Attorney-General: Yes, it is quite clear. Your Lordship saw the original documents which were produced, and, fortunately, one is able to remove any misapprehension with regard to that, because quite naturally it might have been thought that that was only sent out in consequence of what had happened. The Easter holiday had intervened, and apparently the letter was not sent immediately.
Now, my Lord, that brought us to the 16th April, when the letter was sent, to which attention has been called, and which undoubtedly is an important letter.
The Commissioner: Yes, but you have now got to a date after the "Titanic" disaster.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: Has anything been done up to now?
The Attorney-General: No. It is quite right to say nothing has been done; I mean no Rule has been made at present.
The Commissioner: Are you going to wait for the Report of the other Committee?
The Attorney-General: I am going to tell your Lordship what happened with regard to it. The vessels first of all have agreed and the passenger-carrying vessels of 15,000 tons and upwards have agreed now, as was stated by the President and also was stated in evidence here, to place a sufficient number of boats on board to carry the number of passengers on the vessel. That is the position. Your Lordship heard what happened with regard to the "Olympic." I do not know whether your Lordship saw it when you were there, but we did certainly and a great number of boats were on the deck, principally Berthon boats that had been provided in order to meet what was the very natural anxiety of the public at the time, after the "Titanic" disaster.
The Commissioner: What I asked was this. Are you going to wait for the Report of the other Committee?
The Attorney-General: That must depend, my Lord. Of course, the Board of Trade has not known up to now whether your Lordship is going to report or not upon it. I mean to say whether, as a result of this Report they may be going to alter the Rules. I do not know, and it is not for me to say, but I should very much doubt whether those Rules would be sufficient now.
The Commissioner: Have you read them?
The Attorney-General: Yes, I have.
The Commissioner: I have not. I know nothing about them.
The Attorney-General: I have read them, and I have read the scale.
The Commissioner: I do not know what it is that you expect me to report which would affect this question. What is it that you expect me to do that will affect this question of the Rules?
The Attorney-General: Of course, your Lordship may come to the conclusion that you will not say anything about the number of boats that ought to be carried, but I rather gathered from what your Lordship said at an early stage that you did not intend to say what number of boats should be carried, but nevertheless your Lordship may come to the conclusion that a greater number of boats should be carried, not only than were in fact carried, but that it was suggested should be carried in the recommendations of the Committee, and your Lordship sees from any point of view the result of all this evidence must throw a considerable amount of light upon it.
The Commissioner: People outside say the Board of Trade are always waiting for somebody else to do something for them.
The Attorney-General: Of course, the Board of Trade may make a Rule at once. It ought not to make a Rule at once, but then the difficulty of it is, I should have thought, that in a panic it ought not to do it.
The Commissioner: Clearly not.
The Attorney-General: And it ought not to make a Rule which is going to affect the whole of the shipping trade without the fullest consideration; and further, it ought not to make a Rule of this character without taking the advice of experts, and therefore it must refer it to a Committee. I mean it ought not to depend upon its own officials, and at least Parliament did not think so, because that is why it appointed the Committee, but whether Parliament is right or not I am not going to say.
The Commissioner: You must act at the end of it, of course.
The Attorney-General: You must act, certainly.
The Commissioner: You must act at some time.
The Attorney-General: Certainly; but you must get advice before you act; and as in this particular case, as your Lordship will remember, what happened was that Rules were formulated, and of course if it had not been for the disaster which has taken place, the Rules, no doubt, would have been in force.
The Commissioner: They first of all formulated Rules between 1894 and 1911. First of all in 1911 they came to the conclusion that some change in their old Rules was desirable.
The Attorney-General: Yes.
The Commissioner: Then they communicated with four of their best men, and those four gentlemen in course of time bring forward new Rules, different of course, but they all agree in one matter, that an increase in the number of boats is desirable, and after those Reports are made, without sending those Reports to the Advisory Committee, they write to the Advisory Committee, and the Advisory Committee having considered the matter, refer it to a sub-committee. That sub-committee then considers the question that is referred to them and reports to the Advisory Committee, and that Report is sent on to the Board of Trade, and then the Board of Trade tell them that they cannot act, we must have a number of experiments, and then there are a number of experiments; then after the experiments are made, after a considerable interval, comes a letter. But it seems to me very strange that nothing was done in the interval, and nothing has been done even yet.
The Attorney-General: Yes; but your Lordship will remember that the Committee only makes recommendations with regard to depth and breadth. They do not formulate Rules.
The Commissioner: No, not at all. It is no part of their duty to do so.
The Attorney-General: But then the Board of Trade formulates the Rules which provide in detail for the dimensions of the boats which are to be constructed. Those are the draft Rules which are at pages 28 and 29, and which go into detail,
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and which, of course, can only be done by the Board of Trade, and as they thought ought only to be done by them after they had had experiments made by their Principal Officers in Liverpool, Glasgow and London. When they got those reports then, did they formulate the Rules? Then having got those Rules, they tell the Committee what they are going to do.
The Commissioner: How do you explain the delay between 1890 and 1911?
The Attorney-General: 1894 your Lordship means.
The Commissioner: Yes, 1894 and 1911. During the whole of that time apparently ships were increasing in size; they were carrying more and more people?
The Attorney-General: Yes; but the view taken always was that the number of boats was sufficient as in the first instance, when the Rule was first formulated.
The Commissioner: But the question is, was that a reasonable view to take. It evidently was not the right view; and the shipowners themselves recognised that it was not the right view, because they themselves increased them far beyond the statutory requirements.
The Attorney-General: I quite agree; but it was the view taken as the result of the Committee which sat in those days.
The Commissioner: Which days?
The Attorney-General: 1890 and 1894, my Lord.
The Commissioner: Yes, but then things change.
The Attorney-General: Yes, that is quite right, my Lord; but at the same time, since 1894, when the Rules were formulated for 10,000 tons and upwards, you have got vessels much above that tonnage.
The Commissioner: The biggest boat in those days, if I recollect rightly, did not exceed 13,000 tons.
The Attorney-General: Not quite 13,000. The "Lucania" was one. And then the provision was made, of course, that anything over and above 10,000 tons would have to carry this particular number of boats, and there it was left, and nothing further was done. The view seems to have been that as we were proceeding, and vessels were being constructed which were better equipped as regards watertight compartments, the larger vessels that were being constructed had the best provision for watertight compartments, and that, therefore, they were as unsinkable as it was possible to make vessels according to the view that was held up to that time, and it appears that with the larger vessels carrying passengers and emigrants, it was thought that the vessels were practically unsinkable. That is the reason, as far as I am able to make out.
The Commissioner: The reason for the long delay between 1894 and 1911 is stated in the evidence of Sir Alfred Chalmers at page 630. Mr. Aspinall was examining the witness and it begins thus: "I considered the matter very closely from time to time. I first of all considered the record of the trade - that is to say, the record of the casualties - and to see what immunity from loss there was. I found it was the safest mode of travel in the world, and I thought it was neither right nor the duty of a State department to impose regulations upon that mode of travel as long as the record was a clean one." I do not read the whole of it, but it goes on much further; however, that reason was as forcible at any time before the disaster to the "Titanic" as during those years that he is talking about. I do not see why, unless the "Titanic" disaster had happened they should have altered the watertight compartments according to that view. But there is this to be said, Mr. Attorney - I do not know whether you will agree with me - that if they had made Rules, the Rules would not in all probability have provided for a larger number of boats that there were in fact carried on the "Titanic." That is so, is it not?
The Attorney-General: Oh, yes.
The Commissioner: So that it may be said that the absence of the Rules in no way aggravated the calamity that happened. At the same time the delay that took place does require some explanation. Perhaps it is in that evidence of Sir Alfred Chalmers. It strikes the imagination at once! Rules made in 1894, laying down how many boats should be carried by ships up to 10,000 tons and upwards; nothing done until the "Titanic" disaster, and nothing done even now.
The Attorney-General: Well, I do not think there is any complaint to be made about what has happened since April.
The Commissioner: Sir Alfred Chalmers was rather emphatic about it.
The Attorney-General: I know. He took a very strong view.
The Commissioner: He did, and Captain Young said he did not agree.
The Attorney-General: Quite, and that was the position. Sir Alfred Chalmers was of opinion that it was unnecessary, and he adhered to that view when he was in the Box; and at any rate that was the opinion that he had formed.
The Commissioner: It is not perhaps quite fair to ask you the question, and, therefore, I cannot expect you to answer it, but do you think that there was no delay?
The Attorney-General: Delay there certainly was.
The Commissioner: Unnecessary delay.
The Attorney-General: During what period my Lord? If you are asking during the period from 1894 to 1911, the only answer I think one can make - you may accept it or not, you may think that it was wrong on somebody's part or not, I do not know, - but the answer is made, and the view that was taken about it was that it was not necessary to provide for it. That was the reason apparently why they had not provided for it right away through.
The Commissioner: If it was not necessary then why is it considered necessary now?
The Attorney-General: There is a little more light thrown upon it now. It never was thought that you would have to take off the whole of your passengers by your boats and of course it is very easy to make reflections upon what the Board of Trade was doing with regard to this, but the same view was taken abroad.
The Commissioner: What occurred to me was that the Board of Trade may be said to have been much too cautious. To be very cautious is a very good thing, but you can be too cautious.
The Attorney-General: Yes, but what I was remarking upon was that even in Germany, with regard to which your Lordship, of course, asked questions as to what they had done, and where they did have a scale over and above the scale that we have here, still their scale did not provide for everybody who was to be carried on board the vessel.
The Commissioner: I quite understand that.
The Attorney-General: Of course, I agree. I pointed out in the course of the case that it was a bigger scale, undoubtedly, than the one that would be required here.
The Commissioner: Now you cannot finish today?
The Attorney-General: I am afraid not, my Lord.
The Commissioner: Obviously, you cannot. When shall we see you again?
The Attorney-General: On Wednesday morning, my Lord.
The Commissioner: Very well. And you will promise, if I do not interrupt you, to finish on Wednesday?
The Attorney-General: I do not like to make a promise with that condition, my Lord, because, if I may say so, I welcome interruptions of all kinds, but I will promise to finish, notwithstanding your Lordship's interruptions, if I may put it in that way.